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CAN FACTORY L I S T DISCLOSURE IMPROVE L A B O R
PRACTICES IN T H E APPAREL INDUSTRY? A C A S E STUDY OF
N I K E AND LEVI-STRAUSS
Abstract: How would multinational apparel companies and retailers react
to a requirement to disclose the identity and address of the factories in
their global supply chain? Could disclosure regulation of this sort cause
management changes that could lead to improved labor practices in those
factories? Disclosure regulation is a common tool in the arsenal of socalled "decentered" regulatory strategies, which emphasize ways that law
can be used to guide and influence the private development of behavioral
norms that are consistent with the state's pohcy objectives. The author
traces the history of factory disclosure, and theorizes that mandatory
factory list disclosure introduces into the management system a new "risk
vims" that companies will seek to manage through systems changes that
can ultimately lead to improvements on the factory floors. To explore this
theory, the author conducted extensive interviews with senior executives
of Nike, Inc. and Levi-Strauss, two companies that recently released their
global factory lists "voluntarily". The research indicates that these
companies prepared extensively for the moment of disclosure by
significantly improving and investing in their global labor practices
monitoring and inspection systems. Neither company identified any
negative business effects from the factory disclosure, but both emphasized
that the disclosure had facihtated greater collaboration within the industry
emphasizing shared strategies to improve supply chain labor practices.
These outcomes are potentially useful in the straggle to improve labor
practices. Therefore, the author proposes factory list disclosure regulation
as an attainable and relatively subtle use of law that might nevertheless
contribute in meaningful ways to the challenge of improving working
conditions around the world.
Keywords: labor practices, Nike, Levi-Strauss, multinational apparel
companies, factory list disclosure, regulation
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C A N FACTORY L I S T DISCLOSURE IMPROVE L A B O R
P R A C T I C E S IN T H E A P P A R E L INDUSTRY? A

CASE

STUDY OF NIKE AND LEVI-STRAUSS^
David J. Doorey*

I . INTRODUCTION
Information disclosure regulation is experiencing a renaissance. This
development parallels, indeed is part of, a more general interest in socalled "post modem" regulatory approaches to govemance that
concentrate on the role of the state and regulation as a facilitator of the
development of normative standards of conduct by private actors.
Appearing under monikers such as "responsive", "reflexive", "outsourced" and "decentered" regulation, or "new govemance" and "third
way" regulation, these approaches to regulation share an emphasis on the
norm creating potential of private interactions—^negotiations, conflicts,
and compromises—^between businesses and various state and non-state
actors, including non-govemmental organizations (NGOs), unions,
shareholders, consumer groups, religious-based organization, and other
* Assistant Professor, Yorlc LTniversity, Toronto. Tliis research is generously supported
by a Research Fellowship from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of
Canada and the Helena Orton Memorial Fellowship of Osgoode Hall Law School. This
paper was presented at the CRIMT Conference, "What Policies for a Global Era?", HEC
Montreal, 2007.
' This paper draws on interviews with Michael Kobori, Vice President Coiporate Code of
Conduct, Levi-Strauss at his office in San Francisco in 2006 and Caitlin Morris, Director
of Engagement and Integration, Labor Comphance Department, Nike, at Nike's
Headquarters' in Beaverton, Oregon in 2006, as well as discussions and/or e-mail
communications with: Neil Kearney, General Secretary, International Textile, Garment,
and Leather Workers' Federation in Toronto, 2006; Bob Jeffcott and Lynda Yanz of the
Maquila Solidarity Network, in Toronto, 2005 and 2006; Hai-vey Chan, Director, Ethical
Sourcing, Mountain Equipment Co-op, in Toronto, 2007; and Patrick Neyts, VECTRA
International, in Toronto, 2007.
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civil society organizations.^
Information disclosure regulation is an
important tool in this approach to govemance because it aims to influence
private behavior indirectly, but towards the attainment of state-desired
outcomes.
Disclosure regulation can inject new risks, like a vims, into management
decision-making processes in the expectation that corporate leaders will
seek to manage that risk in ways the state believes will further its policy
objectives. Regulatory examples abound: disclosure of toxic emissions
will cause companies to reduce emissions^; disclosure of executive salaries
will cause compensation committees to impose salaries that are reasonable
and fair'*; disclosure of racial and gender percentages of employees will
discourage discriminatory employment practices; disclosure of the race of
loan recipients will discourage racially discriminatory lending practices by
lending institutions^; disclosure of payments to foreign officials will
discourage bribery^, and so on.

^ This literature is discussed in greater detail in: David J. Doorey, Who Made That?:
Influencing Foreign Labor Practices Through Domestic Disclosure Regulation, 43
Osgoode Hall L.J. 353 (2005).
See also Julia Black, Decentring Regulation:
Understanding the Role of Regulation and Self-Regulation in a 'Post-Regulatory' World,
53 Curr. Legal Probs. 103 (2001); Orel Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation
and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 Minn. L. Rev. 342
(2004).
^ See the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1100150 (2005); William Pederson, Regulation and Information Disclosure: Parallel Universes
and Beyond , 25 Harv. Envd. L. Rev. 151, 151 (2001); M . Stephan, Environmental
Information Disclosure Programs: They Work, But Why?, 83 Soc. Sci. Q. 190 (2002); R.
Percival et a l . Environmental Regulation: Law, Science, and Policy 624 (2"'' ed. Little
Brown & Co 1996) (the theory behind the legislation was that the emissions information
"would enable the public to put substantial pressure on companies to reduce emissions").
See, e.g. E. lacobucci, The Effects of Disclosure on Executive Compensation, 48 U.
Toronto L.J. 489, 501 (1998).
^ See the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-10 (1994).
^ See the Foreign Corrapt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1998); H. L. Brown,
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Under the 1988 Amendments to the Foreign Corrapt Practices
Act: Does the Government's Reach Exceed its Grasp?, 26 N.C.J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg.
239 (2001).
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The underlying theory is the same in each instance: companies will reduce
or refrain altogether from engaging in practices the state perceives as
undesirable i f they are forced to admit pubhcly that they are engaging in
those practices.^ The reasons why law-makers expect this to be the case
are complex and varied, but they usually include a belief that companies
will be concemed that they will be punished financially i f the information
disclosed is deemed unacceptable to important stakeholders, such as
customers and investors. The "science" of designing disclosure regulation
is in knowing, or learning, whether the disclosure requirement will be
perceived as a risk by the target of the regulation and, i f so, how the target
will then react.
This in tum requires the state to be an astute obsei-ver of the environment
in which the target of the disclosure regulation operates. What motivates
it? What are its vulnerabilities? With which other actors does it engage in
cooperative or antagonistic relations, and how might those other actors put
the new information disclosed to use in those engagements? By studying
these sorts of questions, the state might be able to predict how certain
actors will respond to a requirement to disclose information they would
rather keep secret.
Recent proposals by NGOs for states to require apparel companies to
disclose the precise name and address of every factory involved in the
production of their products operate on the same basic model as these
other disclosure models. The idea is that the apparel corporations will
alter their behavior in useful ways in order to manage the perceived
additional risk associated with a completely transparent supply chain.
The main risk, simply stated, is that antagonistic actors will use that
information to investigate factory conditions and then publicize labor
abuses discovered in them with the aim of influencing consumer and
investor markets in ways unfavorable to the apparel company.

^ For work discussing labor practices and transparency, see C. Sabel, D. O'Rourke, A.
Fung, Can We Put an End to Sweatshops? (Beacon Press 2001); Cynthia Williams, The
SEC and Corporate Social Transparency 112 Hai-vard L. Rev. 1197 (1999); Doorey,
supra note 2; K. Kolben, Integrative Linkage: Combining Public and Private Regulatory
Approaches in the Design of Trade and Labor Regimes, 48 Harv. Int'l L.J. 203 (2007).
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Since no state presently requires disclosure of global factory lists, we lack
sufficient data to test this theory. However, we do have hypothesis's.
Advocates of factory disclosure have a robust and sophisticated vision of
how mandatory factory disclosure would contribute to the stmggle to
improve labor conditions in factories supplying the global apparel
industry. And we now also have a proxy of sorts, because several large
apparel and sportswear corporations have recently disclosed their factory
lists "voluntarily", under sustained pressure from NGOs and labor groups
for years to take this step. This enables us to explore some important
questions, such as: Why were these companies prepared to disclose their
supplier list when most companies continue to assert that this information
is of immeasurable business value? What management systems were
implemented by these companies to manage and reduce the perceived risk
of factory disclosure? What effects has factory disclosure had on the
disclosing company, and on the industry more generally? Are there
lessons for labor policy within the story of voluntary factory disclosure,
and i f so, what are they?
This paper begins to explore these questions. In Part I , I summarize the
key normative assertions of advocates of mandatory factory disclosure,
focusing on the ways in which factory disclosure is expected to positively
influence the management of supply chain labor practices.
Part 11
examines the origins of the factory disclosure movement, tracing its roots
in the early 1990s to its modem day place in the NGO movement to
influence labor practices in the global apparel industry. Drawing on
interviews with senior corporate responsibility officials from each
company, Part 111 then explores in detail how two industry leaders, Nike
and Levi-Strauss, decided in 2005 to publicly release their global factory
databases. Finally, in Part IV, I will explore the impact that factory
disclosure has had to date on these companies and within the industry. I
will conclude by assessing what lessons for the possibilities of factory
disclosure regulation we might take from the voluntary factory disclosure
at Nike and Levi-Strauss. Ultimately, I conclude that factory disclosure
may induce reactions within companies that could benefit the governance
of labor practices within the global apparel industry. My conclusion
therefore is that factory disclosure deserves careful consideration as a
labor policy in the future.
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I I . FACTORY DISCLOSURE AND ITS I N F L U E N C E ON
T H E GOVERNANCE
O F SUPPLY CHAIN
LABOR
PRACTICES: T H E THEORY
In Canada, the principle advocate for factory disclosure has been a small,
yet influential NGO called the Maquila Sohdarity Network (MSN) based
in Toronto, and a related organization for which MSN serves as
Secretariat, the Ethical Trading Action Group (ETAG).^ In early 2 0 0 1 ,
ETAG sent a letter to Canada's Industry Minister proposing a change to
the Regulations to the federal govemment's Textile Labelling Act that
would require disclosure of the factory identify and address to be made
available for all apparel goods sold in Canada. The proposal was to utilize
the existing regulatory model, which already requires a variety of
information to be disclosed on product labels (such as fibre content, the
name of the dealer, and the country of origin).^ ETAG's proposal was for
factories to be made publicly available on a govemment website by
entering the "CA Number" on the label of the product. The website
already exists, as does the CA Number identification system.'^ The ETAG
proposal sought merely to require one additional piece of information:
factory name and address."

^ Several American-based organizations have pushed for factory disclosure, most notably
the United Students Against Sweatshops (USAS), as described in Part II. Other American
organizations that have proposed factory disclosure include: International Right to Know
Campaign
(http://www.irtk.org),
the
Global
Corporate
Sunshine
Group
(http://www.corporatesunshine.org),
and
the
National
Labor
Committee
(http://www.nlcnet.org).
' See Textile Labelling and Advertising Regulations, C.R.C., c. 1551, esp. ss. 11-12.
See Competition Bureau Canada CA Identification Number - FAQs,
http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/app/cb/canumber/faqs.do;jsessionid=0000NyX45Orf8yS79CVfOh
04dQf:vddllsjb?language=eng (last visited Nov 3, 2007).
" See Ethical Trading Action Group, Transparency and Disclosure: New Regulatoiy
Tools to Challenge Sweatshop Abuses: Submission to Pubhc Policy Forum's National
Consultation
on
Textile
Labelling
(September
30,
2003),
http://en.maquilasolidarity.org/sites/maquilasolidarity.org/files/ETAGTransparencyandDi
sclosure.pdf
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In 2 0 0 2 , Industry Canada ordered a public consultation to examine the
proposal. In its submission, ETAG argued that a regulation requiring
factory disclosure would have the following positive effects:
...factory disclosure regulation would be good for the Canadian
apparel industry, as well as for garment w^orkers that make its
products, because it would encourage Canadian companies to become
more knowledgeable about their supply chains, establish longer term
business relationships with tmsted suppliers, and better monitor labor
practices in their supplier factories.
These arguments are both intriguing and sophisticated from a regulatory
perspective. The central premise of ETAG's argument is that disclosure
regulation will provoke reactions within the management of the apparel
companies, and that these reactions w^ill ultimately contribute to a more
positive environment for labor within the global supply chains. ETAG,
and other supporters of mandatory factory disclosure, assume that factory
disclosure will be interpreted by corporations as a risk, like a "vims" that
needs to be managed and controlled. The strength of the vims lies in the
threat that consumers (and investors) may be convinced to punish the
apparel company, but empowering consumers is not the principal
objective of factory disclosure. Rather, the primary objective is to
empower NGOs and labor organizations in their engagements with
multinational apparel companies.
Therefore, factory disclosure is about shifting the balance of power as
between apparel companies and retailers (and to a lesser degree, the
suppliers) and the many local and transnational advocacy networks'^
engaged in pressuring these companies to effect positive change in labor
practices. For example, ETAG wrote that factoiy disclosure would give
social activists:

" Id. at 10.
See D. Tmbek, J. Mosher, & J. Rothstein, Transnationalism in the Regulation of Labor
Relations: International Regimes and Transnational Advocacy Networks, 25 (4) Law &
Soc. Inquiry 1187 (2000) (discusses transnational advocacy networks in the labor sphere).
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.. .the capabiUty to Unk particular abuses and particular struggles at
southern factories to particular brands and articles of clothing.
Canadian labor rights activists w^ould be able to engage in practical
and effective solidarity with workers who try to organize to
improve conditions squeezing the company between workers
organizing on one end and consumer organizing on the other.
Every claim by a corporation or a monitoring organization about
conditions in a particular factory could more easily be independently
investigated by coalitions of labor activists.
Unions and NGOs in the labor field have already shown themselves to be
quite adept at organizing damaging public relations campaigns that target
the sourcing apparel corporations when abusive factory conditions are
discovered in a supplier factory. Factory disclosure would make it easier
and cheaper to link factories to specific brands and to organize campaigns
around these linkages.''* It is this risk that in theory would motivate the
apparel corporations to pay greater attention to what is going on in their
supplier factories. Advocates of factory disclosure predict that apparel
corporations and factory owners would take a number of potentially useful
steps in order to manage the factory disclosure "vims".

A . A N T I C I P A T E D RESPONSES B Y A P P A R E L C O M P A N I E S T O
FACTORY L I S T DISCLOSURE
1. "SELF" LEARNING ABOUT THE SUPPLY CHAIN

One obvious effect of mandatory factory disclosure is that it would cause
companies to learn what factories they are using. This alone would be a
useful contribution to the challenge to improving supply chain labor
practices. Many companies still use sourcing agents and take a hands-off
approach to the selection of their suppliers. As a resuh, as a spokesperson
for the Retail Counsel of Canada ("RCC") conceded in 2002, "tracking
''' H. Arthurs, Labor Law Without a State, 46 U. Toronto L.J. I (1995) (arguing that the
many linkages in the modern global supply chain create muhiple vulnerabilities for
multinational corporations).
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clothing factories is almost impossible" for these companies. These
companies may care significantly about design, fabric, stitch quantity,
quality issues, and delivery deadlines, and may monitor these issues very
closely, but they do not care who is making the product to their
specifications.
Of course, if tracking factories is impossible, then so too is tracking labor
conditions in those factories. Therefore, i f the RCC position (as stated
above) is an accurate depiction of the apparel industry in Canada, then the
inescapable conclusion is that self-regulation of labor conditions in
supplier factories is failing miserably. Advocates of factory disclosure
point out that it is irresponsible for companies to ignore where their
products are made and that i f factory disclosure regulation could force
companies to compile and maintain a list of factories, this alone would be
a useful start and a good use of regulation.
2. IMPROVED INTERNAL COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS AND BETTER FACTORY
MONITORING

Factory disclosure may also cause improved communications systems
within the apparel corporations.
The risk of being publicly associated
with a "sweatshop" factory is increased with factory disclosure. Factory
disclosure advocates believe this creates an incentive for apparel
companies to implement more organized and thorough monitoring
processes to limit the chances of horrific labor practices being discovered
first by extemal actors. They believe also that it will cause companies to
implement better information flow systems that enable quick
communication up the information ladder to senior labor compliance
personnel who possess both the incentive and the authority to implement
measures to extinguish problems before they become potential public
relations problems.
3. ENCOURAGE LONGER TERM SUPPLIER CONTRACTS

Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, Cut it Out Campaign Focuses on Sweatshop
Labor (27 March 2002), www.cbc.ca/consumers/mar]<;et/files/home/cutitout/ (quoting
Sharon Maloney, Retail Counsel of Canada; excerpt re CBC Marketplace broadcast
produced by Erica Johnson).
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Factory disclosure may also discourage the particularly harmful practice of
"cutting and running". This occurs when companies cut ties with a factory
found to have been engaged in poor labor practices, rather than remaining
but working to improve those practices. A key to improving labor
practices in the apparel industry is to encourage longer term relationships
between apparel companies and the suppUer factories. Raising labor
standards often requires fmancial and resource investment by factory
owners who in tum require some assurance that these cost outlays will not
be met with cancelled contracts as the apparel companies seek cheaper
altematives.
With a complete list of factories, labor activists can more effectively
monitor the movement of supply contracts. For example, i f workers at
Factory A in Honduras organize a union and bargain improved conditions,
observers can carefully track how particular apparel companies that use
that factory react. I f companies pull out, campaigns can be organized to
pressure the company to retum i f the local workers believe that will help.
At present, most companies are able to avoid this sort of scmtiny because
tracking factory movement is extremely difficult. I f labor advocates
could use factory disclosure to pressure and embarrass companies that
engage in "cut and mn" sourcing strategies, then disclosure might
encourage the apparel companies to forge longer term relationships with
their supphers.'^
4. LINKING EMPLOYEE EVALUATIONS TO LABOR COMPLIANCE MEASURES

The increased risk of negative exposure associated with public factory
disclosure may also cause apparel companies to integrate labor compliance
measures into employee evaluation and compensation schemes. Some
apparel companies now employ staff specifically responsible for
monitoring labor practices in supplier factories. In other cases, sourcing
employees are expected to protect the company's interests by pressuring
MSN engaged in an effective campaign in 2000 tiiat embarrassed The Hudson's Bay
Company for its decision to pull contracts from a factoiy in Lesotho after labor abuses
were discovered there. MSN awarded HBC its "Sweatshop Retailer of the Year Award"
for its decision to "cut and run", while simultaneously praising The Gap, who responded
to news of the abuses by maintaining its contract with the factoiy and to pressure the
owners to improve their labor practices. See Doorey, supra note 2, at 403-404.

10

C L P E RESEARCH PAPER SERIES

[VOL. 0 4 NO. 0 1

supplier factories to comply with local laws or codes of conduct. Insofar
as a company's human resource pohcies involve employee evaluations, it
seems logical that the evaluation criteria for these sorts of employees
would include some measurement of how well factories are performing in
terms of labor compliance issues.
This in tum might increase the
incentive for those employees to be vigilant in their efforts to pressure
suppliers to comply with labor standards.
5. IMPROVED COMMUNICATIONS WITH STAKEHOLDERS AND COMPETITORS

Another anticipated benefit of factory disclosure is that it will encourage
greater engagement by companies with competitors and extemal actors,
including labor-related NGOs. Factory disclosure could facilitate more
investigations and external reviews of factory conditions by NGOs,
unions, media, and academics, for instance, and because disclosure
permits these extemal reviewers to easily link factories to brands, the
belief is that the apparel companies will find themselves dialoguing with
the extemal actors more frequently.
Moreover, when supplier lists
become public information, so that there are no secrets about which
factories are being used by which company, the potential benefits of
collaborating with competitors about shared problems will become more
obvious. I f seven apparel companies are sourcing from the same factory,
there may be no need to conduct seven different internal audits i f the
companies can agree to share infonnation and work together to design
remediation problems.

B . A N T I C I P A T E D RESPONSE OF F A C T O R Y O W N E R S
(CONTRACTORS) TO FACTORY LIST DISCLOSURE

Factory disclosure may also infiuence the behavior of factory owners.
Most suppliers desire contracts from major brands like Nike, Levis, and
The Gap, for example. Suppliers that have contracts with these major
companies will often advertise this fact as proof of their quality and
reliabihty to attract new customers. Under a system of mandatory factory
disclosure, suppliers to major brands are more likely to attract attention
from labor advocates. Factory owners who have an interest in presei-ving
their contracts with the major apparel companies, will wish to avoid
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embarrassing investigations exposing violations of labor laws or codes of
conduct that might cause the brands to cancel orders. In this way,
requiring apparel companies to disclose their supplier factories introduces
a new risk for the factory owners as well as the apparel companies.
Part of the risk to the factory owner is that their relationship with the
apparel company may make the factory vulnerable in the event of union
organizing campaigns or other controversies relating to labor practices in
the factories. Pressure from the apparel company to avoid labor-related
controversies may de facto restrict the range of actions available to the
factory owner. A simple example can expose how. Box 1 sets out the list
of Canadian factories supplying Nike and Levi-Sfrauss, as disclosed in
both company's 2005 factory disclosure lists. Another 2 5 0 odd Canadian
factories are disclosed on the website ofthe WRC'^.
Box 1: Canadian Factories Supplying Nike and Levi-Strauss, 2005
Nike
Canada Bestile Apparel Inc, 841 Progress Ave., Scarborough Ontario Mlh 2x4
Canada Ce Composites Baseball 5390 Canotek Road Unit 20 Ottawa Ontario K l j lh8
Canada Ironhead Originals Inc. 45 Ironside Crescent Unit 4 Toronto Ontario Mix ln3
Canada Kiangtex Co. Ltd 46 Hollinger Road Toronto Ontario M4b 3g5
Canada Lamasz Sport Inc 435 Limestone Crescent Toronto Ontario M3j 2rl
Canada Les Vetements Sp Apparel Inc. 1237 Boulevard Industriel Granby Quebec J2j 2b8
Canada Mcgregor Industries Inc. 401 Wellington Street West Toronto Ontario M5v 21i7
Canada Silver Spider Knitting Ltd. 212 Supertest Road Toronto Ontario M3j 2m2
Canada The Athletic Sportshow Inc. 2473 Dixie Road Mississauga Ontario L4y 2al
Canada The Incredible Clothing Company - Dufferin 4548 Dufferin Street Toronto Ontario M3h 5s2
Levi-Strauss
Canada, Forever Garments, 1025 Westport Crescent, Mississauga, L5T 1E8
Canada, H.A. Sheldon Canada Ltd., 2025 Midland Ave., Scarborough MIP 3E6
Canada, Print Outfit Inc., 5435 Maingate Drive, Mississauga, L4W 106
Canada, SDR Distribution Set-vices, 1880 Matheson Blvd., Mississauga, L4W 5N4

Canadian unions, such as UNITE-HERE Canada for example, could target
factories on the hst for organizing campaigns. The same challenges that
See
Worker
Rights
Consortium,
Factoi-y
Disclosure
http://www.workersrights.org/search/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2007).

Database,
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exist in every organizing campaign would still confront the Union.
However, if preserving their contracts with the major brands is valuable to
them, then these factory owners have a particular vulnerability that the
union could exploit in their organizing campaign. The organizing union
could present a letter, copied to Nike or Levi-Strauss as the case may be,
advising that any illegal conduct during the campaign will result, not only
in unfair labor practice charges, but also in a public campaign against the
factory owner and the apparel company, and i f applicable, complaints filed
with the Workers Rights Consortium or the Fair Labor Association (both
of which are discussed below). UNITE could advise the companies also
that it is working with local (Maquila Solidarity Network in Toronto) and
foreign (Clean Clothes Campaign, etc.) NGOs in the campaign, and that
the company's behavior will be closely watched and misconduct publicly
reported.
This is no guarantee of union organizing success of course, but factory
disclosure can be used as one of many tools in the sorts of creative
corporate campaigns unions are already using to battle employers.'^ The
same process can be used for factories in developing countries. The key
lies in the ability of civil society organizations and unions to coordinate
transnational networks that can track labor practices in factories, link those
factories to the brand-sensitive companies that source from them, and
wage successful public relations campaigns challenging those practices.
Factory disclosure makes this easier, and to the extent that factory owners
and apparel brands perceive a risk in these sorts of campaigns, factory
disclosure may encourage some factory owners to steer clear of
controversy by staying within the bounds of acceptable labor practices, as
defined by laws or codes of conduct.

I I I . T H E ORIGINS OF F A C T O R Y DISCLOSURE
Factory list disclosure is not the brainchild of govemments. Like so much
of the contemporary govemance of labor practices within the global
supply chains of multinational apparel companies, factory disclosure has
See, e.g., D. J. Doorey, Neutrality Agreements: Bargaining Association Rights in the
Shadow ofthe State, 11(1) Can. Lab. & Emp. L.J. 41, 43 (2006).
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its origins in grass roots movements of private, non-state actors seeking to
address perceived failures by states to protect workers.
It gained
prominence in the late 1990s, primarily as a result of the efforts of a group
of university students in the United States.

A . T H E U N I T E D STUDENTS A G A I N S T SWEATSHOPS & T H E
WORKERS' RIGHTS CONSORTIUM

The story begins in the summer of 1997 at the New York offices of
UNITE. The Union assigned several university student interns the task of
investigating relationships between university apparel and labor
sweatshops in the supply chains of multinational apparel companies.'^
The Union was considering a campaign targeting student awareness of the
exploitation of workers in the apparel industry. The interns began
questioning university administrators, and they quickly leamed that the
universities did little to investigate how and where their branded clothing
was made.
Informal campaigns soon began at universities such as North Carolina
(Chapel Hill), Duke, Michigan, Wisconsin, and California, as students
sought information and affirmations from administrators that university
branded clothing was not being made in factories in which labor laws were
violated. Initially, these inquiries focused primarily on clothing made by
Nike and Reebok, two companies that were receiving negative media
attention at that time for the labor practices in their overseas supplier
factories. University apparel was not an insignificant market for these
companies. In the late 1990s, for example, Nike alone had exclusive
suppher deals with several large American universities worth in millions
of dollars, and the university apparel market was worth in the billions of
dollars to apparel companies.^"

L. Featherstone, Students Against Sweatshops 11 (Verso 2002).
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By early 1998, a significant grassroots movement of students had
emerged, motivated to challenge their university administrations on the
issue of university apparel and factory conditions. In the spring of that
year, students from over 30 schools converged on New York City, where
they formed the United Students Against Sweatshops (USAS). These
events coincided with negotiations under the Apparel Industry Partnership
("AIP"), an initiative introduced by the Clinton Govemment in 1997
designed to detract pubhc criticism of the apparel industry by creating a
model of private govemance that would address the seemingly endless
stream of reports about labor abuses in apparel factories both in the U.S.
and abroad. In 1998, the AIP, bloodied by the late defection of the two
union participants, announced the creation of the Fair Labor Association
("FLA"), an organization that would monitor factories and encourage best
practices within the apparel industry.
From its outset, the USAS perceived itself, and was perceived by industry,
as an alternative to the FLA model. Few companies welcomed this
development. The FLA and its supporters aggressively attempted to coopt the movement and the university administrations.^' One concem most
apparel corporations shared was USAS's focus on disclosure and
transparency, which was apparent from its inception. During their 1997
summer internship at UNITE, the students had reviewed existing codes of
conduct promulgated by apparel companies. Tico Almeida, one of those
students, explains how this led USAS's early leaders to focus on
transparency, including factory disclosure:
.. .we noticed that not a single company included a provision for
public disclosure of factory locations or independent monitoring
reports. The conclusion was obvious: i f we were to hold the
manufacturers of our college merchandise accountable, we were
going to have to force them to open themselves to public
scratiny.^^

^' Id. at 13. At one point, according to Featherstone, Clinton's Chief Economic Advisor,
Gene Sperling, promised monthly meetings with USAS i f they supported the FLA
Id. at 16.
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At that time, voluntary public disclosure of the identity of global supply
chain factories was virtually unheard of in the apparel industry. Certainly,
none of the major apparel companies were doing this, and for most, the
idea had probably never been seriously considered.
That began to change in January 1999, when students at Duke University
engaged a sit-in at the University administration's offices demanding, and
ultimately obtaining, an agreement by the University to disclose a list of
every factory that produced apparel for the university. This victory
spawned similar campaigns at other schools, including Georgetown,
Arizona, Wisconsin, North Carolina (Chapel Hill), and Michigan. The
students believed that factory disclosure would enable hnkages between
the students, labor organizations, and the workers in the factories that
could facilitate information sharing about labor practices in the factories
where university apparel was produced.
In July 1999, buoyed with confidence from these victories, the students
met in Washington to plan a way forward. The students agreed to
continue to push for fiill factory disclosure as key objective. They decided
to develop a new organization to help manage the growing database of
global apparel factories, and to develop a stmcture for monitoring and
reporting on conditions of work in those factories that could challenge the
FLA model. The new FLA code required limited independent monitoring
of supplier factories, but required neither public disclosure of factory lists
nor disclosure of the monitors' reports. The new organization was named
the Workers' Rights Consortium (WRC). It held its founding convention
in April 2000.
The approach of the WRC was distinct from that of the FLA in a number
of important ways.
For one thing, it did not include industry
representation on its goveming board, thereby permitting it to claim
independence from the industry it sought to monitor. Its goveming board
consisted of representatives from university administrations, unions,
students, and academics. It did not accredit factories or monitors, because
of the belief that short of a full investigation, it was not possible for a
monitoring organization or a sourcing corporation to know what
conditions of work were during any particular production mn. The WRC
requires schools to adopt a code of conduct (of their choice, but the WRC
also offers a model code) that they will then impose on their supplier
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factories. The model permits workers or organizations to file complaints
alleging breaches of corporate codes of conduct. Those complaints are
then investigated and reports are prepared and published on-line.^^
As noted, schools that affiliate with the WRC—and there are now over
150 of them—must obtain from their suppliers a list of all of the factories
used in the production of the university clothing. The WRC compiles that
list of factories and posts it on the organization's website in a format that
permits searches by factory, university, country of factory, and licensee
name. For example, when we search "Canada", we are given about 250
Canadian factories that supply clothing to Canadian and American
universities that are signatories to the WRC. I f we then link to one of
those factories, we find the name of company, the street address of factory,
and a contact person with their contact information. We can also link to
the particular schools for which the factory is a supplier. The same
information is available for every factory in the database, worldwide.
The apparel companies that supplied schools affiliated with the WRC
found themselves faced with a new conundmm: publicly disclose their
factory list, or risk losing their university apparel contracts.
Some
companies did not initially respond favorably to this demand, including
Nike, as discussed in Part III A. Other companies frankly admitted that
they did not know what factories supplied their products because they used
sourcing agents and intermediaries. This position further supported the
student's argument that the multinational apparel companies were
unaccountable for the conditions of work in their supplier factories.
Nevertheless, by the late 1990's support for factory disclosure was gaining
momentum in the U.S., within university administrations and student
bodies, and now also among labor rights groups. For example, in 1999, an
NGO called the National Labor Committee (NLC), in coordination with a
reUgious-based human rights organization, People of Faith Network,
See, e.g.. Worker Rights Consortium, Assessment Re Gildan Activewear El Progeso
(Honduras): Findings, Recommendations and Status Report (July 29, 2004)
http://www.workersrights.org/Freports/Gildan-El_Progreso_7-29-04,pdf (re. factories
supplying Montreal-based Gildan Activewear),
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initiated a campaign they called "People's Right to Know", which called
upon American companies to publicly disclose their factory lists/'* More
importantly, since many universities were accepting the demands of the
USAS movement for factory disclosure, by 1999, many apparel companies
supplying those universities had begun to disclose their factory lists.
For those companies that relied heavily on the university apparel market,
the loss of business that would be associated with walking away from that
market probably made the decision a relatively easy one. At Gear for
Sports, for example, the university/college market comprised $40 million
dollars in annual sales, or about 20 percent of its total sales.^^ It quickly
accepted the requirement to disclose the factories supplying universities
affiliated with the WRC, and in Febmary 2000, it began pubUshing its
factory database on its website, making it one the first American
companies to do so, a point it then emphasized on its corporate website as
evidence of its commitment to social responsibility.^^
Many other companies also agreed to disclose their factories in order to
preserve their university markets. By October 1999, several months
before the WRC held its founding convention, even Nike had conceded
that the cost of losing the university market outweighed its objection to the
USAS model and factory disclosure. Nike reluctantly now had its first
taste of public factory disclosure, as did many other apparel corporations,
thanks to the USAS movement.^^
The NLC was lead by Charlie Kernaghan, who had famously "made Kathie Lee
Gifford cry" in 1996, when he publicly announced that goods for the television
personality's personal line of clothing were made by Honduran children working long
hours in dangerous conditions.
Press Release, GEAR For Sports, Collegiate
Gear
For
Sports
To
Disclose
Factoiy
List
http://www.gearnosweat.com/oct99.html.

Spoilswear
(October

Manufacturer
27,
1999),

Id. Jansport, a maker of backpacks and apparel, began publishing its supplier factories
at around the same time, however, it has since removed the list from its website. I have
attempted to contact the company by e-mail and phone to obtain an explanation for this,
but I have yet to receive a response.
Its opposition to the WRC did not diminish, however, particularly that of its CEO, Phil
Knight, who expressed his opposition dramatically in 2000 by withdrawing a large
donation to the University of Oregon when the school joined the WRC rather than the
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B . INDUSTRY SLOWLY COMES O N B O A R D

The USASAVRC movement deserves credit for planting the seeds of
factory disclosure, but the idea soon spread beyond university campuses
and began to gain credibility within industry. Companies that had decided
to disclose their factories in order to preserve contracts with university
customers realized quickly that they could use this disclosure to bolster
their public image. I noted earlier how Gear for Sports linked its decision
to disclose its university apparel factories to its self-professed philosophy
of corporate social responsibility. Even Phil Knight of Nike, who had
battled fiercely against the USAS movement and WRC, was not above
bragging that Nike's 1999 agreement to disclose the factories supplying its
university customers was evidence of its commitment to improving labor
practices in its supplier factories.^^
Factory disclosure had begun a slow ascent as a new badge of honor
within the apparel industry. Corporations were taking possession of the
idea, and were using it as evidence that they "had nothing to hide" from
the public."^^ In a 2003 op-ed piece in the British Guardian newspaper, the
Founder and Former CEO of The Body Shop argued that factory
disclosure was a cracial "first step" towards eradicating labor abuses
around the world:
Corporations continue to hide the factories they use around the
world to make the goods we purchase. Wal-Mart, for example,
uses 4400 factories in one Chinese province alone. As a first step,

FLA. See Phil ICnight, Comment, Statement from Nike founder and CEO Philip H.
ICnight regarding the University of Oregon, Oregon Daily Emerald, Apr. 24 2000, at
news,
available
at:
http://media.www.dailyemerald.com/media/storage/paper859/news/2000/04/24/News/Sta
tement.From.Nike.Founder.And.Ceo.Philip.H.ICnight.Regarding.The.University.Of1963996.shtml.
See Phil Knight's opinion piece in The Oregon Emerald, id. (in his list of actions Nike
had taken to address labor issues, he included: "Disclosed the U.S. and global locations of
the 45 factories that produce collegiate hcensed apparel.").
See, e.g., id.
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we need full public disclosure of all factory names and locations.
Such transparency will make it much harder to hide abuses.. .^^
Even the apparel industry newsletter, Juststyle, hopped on the factoiy
disclosure bandwagon when in a 2003 editorial it lamented the FLA's
annual report for its failure to disclose factory addresses.^'
The USAWAVRC model had another important effect. It created a
controlled experiment for the companies by allowing them to disclose a
segment of their factories in a context in which many of their competitors
were doing likewise. Some companies leamed that a proactive response
that included dialogue with NGOs and the WRC upon learning of a
problem in a factory tended to be rewarded by muted criticisms and
occasionally even praise. This realization that "engagemenf with the
labor activist community could sometimes be more beneficial than
confrontation and denial, was not a phenomenon exclusive to the WRC
participants—it is a common theme found in the comments and company
literature of major brand-based companies by the late 1990s. But the
WRC factory disclosure experiment deserves credit for causing at least
some companies to realize that disclosing their factory list did not cause
the sorts of problems they might have previously anticipated.

C. 2005: T H E Y E A R OF V O L U N T A R Y D I S C L O S U R E OF C O M P L E T E
FACTORY LISTS

It is this context that we need to interpret the unlikely events of 2005. In
April 2005, Nike surprised everyone by suddenly releasing its global
factory database, at that time, amounting to nearly 750 factories
worldwide. Other major apparel and footwear companies soon followed:
Levi-Strauss, Timberland, Puma, Adidas, and Reebok. The decision to
^° A. Roddick, The Price of Dignity, The Guardian, Sept. 22 2003. My thanks to ETAG
for referring me to this article, and to the article referred to in the next note.
L. Barrie, Editorial, Juststyle, June 12, 2003 ("If there are any flaws in the report then
the main one must be that the names and the locations of the factories surveyed have not
been disclosed.... [SJurely releasing such information would increase pressure on the
factories to comply.").

20

C L P E RESEARCH PAPER SERIES

[VOL. 04 NO. 01

release complete lists of factory addresses by corporate giants like Nike
and Levi's appeared to instantly and fatally undermine the two most
common industry arguments against factory disclosure.
The first
argument is that it is not possible for companies with complex global
supply chains to track and record a factory database. Nike and Levi's
utilize hundreds of factories dispersed around the globe, yet both were
able pull together their factory list and pubhsh it in quick order.
Maintaining a factory list is not impossible, it is rather an issue of business
model and will power.
The second argument is that factory location is proprietary intellectual
property and that publicizing it would seriously harm the competitiveness
of the apparel companies. This argument loses steam with each new
company that discloses its factory list. If this information is so valuable,
why are leading apparel companies prepared to give the information away
for free? Factory disclosure proponents have always challenged the
argument that factory lists are a foim of "trade secref, pointing out that
apparel industry insiders know which factories are supplying which
companies, or can easily find out.
Michael Kobori, LS's Vice President, Corporate Code of Conduct
supports this assessment:
... its not really proprietary because we share these suppliers with
most of the other brands anyway. We're in the same factories as
Gap ... so they already faiow what we're sourcing... [In] all of
our localities, local NGOs know exactly where Levi's is, where
GAP is, where Nike is. ... [The] other piece of information you
look at is there's movement in the industry. 1 mean people within
our sourcing organization don't stay forever, they go over to
competitors, and competitors' people come over here.
Patrick Neyts, who led LS's Code of Conduct Department before Kobori
and supported the idea of making voluntary factory disclosure, once
responded to the expression of concern within the organization that factory
disclosure would undermine the company's competitive advantage by
compiling a hst of one of LS's competitor's supplier factories. His point
in doing so was to demonstrate to LS executives that industiy insiders can
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quickly find out which factories competitors use i f this were somehow
valuable information.^^
Moreover, even companies that have been unwilling to publicly produce
their factory lists have offered to share this information with their
competitors. For example, in 2004, the Hudson's Bay Company (HBC)
began pushing for an industry database through which competitors could
share information about factories and collaborate on monitoring.^^ Later
that year, HBC joined with several other companies and industry
organizations to form the Fair Factories Clearinghouse, an initiative that
permits apparel companies to share information about their factories,
without that information being made pubhcly available.^'* These
developments suggest that it is not competitors from which apparel
companies seek to hide their factories, but the various antagonistic actors
that may wish to use the information to help organize the workers, or to
expose the conditions in those factories to the outside world.
The flurry of companies disclosing their global factory lists in 2005 did
not immediately trickle across the border to Canada. In the summer of
2005, the Federal Govemment announced in a brief press release that it
would not pursue ETAG's proposal for mandatory factory disclosure.^^ It
referred to the Report it had commissioned from the Conference Board of
Canada, released earlier that year. That Report rejects factoiy disclosure
primarily on the basis that: ( 1 ) industry was strongly opposed to disclosing
its intellectual property to competitors; ( 2 ) the proposal would be

Intei-view with Patrick Neyts, Toronto, 2007. Kobori agreed with this assessment,
noting in a 2006 interview: " I f our competitors want to know where we're sourcing, its
not that hard to find out because the suppliers talk. The supplier will tell us who else is
sourcing with them. We ask them, and they tell us. There's no qualms about sharing that
information.
See M . Strauss, HBC Executive Leads Drive to Stem Sweatshop Labor, Globe and
Mail, May 19 2004 a t B l .
^"^ See, Fair Factories Clearinghouse, http://www.fairfactories.org/index.htm (last visited
Nov. 3 2007).
See Press Release, Industry Canada, Industiy Canada/Minister Emerson Releases
Public Policy Fomm Report
on ETAG
Proposal
(July
22, 2005),
http://www.niarketwire.com/mw/release.do?id=549503.
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technically difficult to implement; and (3) factory disclosure did not
provide consumers with useful information in any event.^^
Ifowever, there are now cracks in the united front of the Canadian apparel
industry. Mountain Equipment Co-op (MEC), a producer and retailer of
outdoor sports apparel and equipment will disclose its complete factory
list beginning in 2008. According to Harvey Chan, MEC's Director of
Ethical Sourcing, the decisions to create his position and to hire him, and
ultimately to disclose the factory list, were the direct result of a campaign
by the Maquila Solidarity Network, which in 2001 "awarded" MEC v^ith
the mock "Fence-sitter of the Year" award.'''' MSN criticized MEC for
seeking to present itself as an ethical company while refusing to take a
clear and firm position supporting freedom of association rights and bans
on child labor and for remaining secretive about its factory monitoring
practices.
In announcing its decision, MEC noted that transparency is now expected
of responsible corporations, and that factory disclosure will encourage
additional factory monitoring by "third parties":
...transparency has become more important than protecting our
resources. We can't foresee to what extent we'll put our business at
risk by disclosing factoiy locations, but we agree that the
information should be made public. We hope that our disclosure
will inspire collective action and encourage third parties to visit
factories and verify conditions.''^

The Conference Board of Canada, Study of A Proposal (and its alternatives) to Amend
the Textile Labelling and Advertising Regulations: Applying the Conference Board's
Optimal Policy Mix Framework (Feb 2003) http://strategis,ic.gc.ca/SSI/ct/ct02546e.pdf I
have argued elsewhere that the Report underestimates the potential impact factoiy
disclosure could have on the internal management systems with the apparel coiporations.
See D.J. Doorey, Disclosure of Factoiy Locations in Global Supply Chains: A Canadian
Proposal to Improve Global Labor Practices, 55 Can. Rev. Soc. Pol'y 104 (2005).
•'^ Interview with Hai^vey Chan, Director of Ethical Sourcing, MEC, Toronto, 2007.
MEC, Can't
You Tell
Us Which Factories
Make Your Gear?,
http://www.mec.ca/Main/contentJext.jsp?FOLDER%3C%3EfolderJd=2534374302883
567&bmUID=l 179328056110, (last visited Nov. 3, 2007).
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Other Canadian companies will be under pressure to follow, as factory
disclosure becomes more entrenched as a norm of corporate social
responsibility.

I V . F A C T O R Y DISCLOSURE AT N I K E AND L E V I STRAUSS ( L S )
The decision of companies like Nike and L S to disclose their factory lists
contrasts so sharply with the general industry practice, particularly in
Canada, that it is intriguing to examine how the decision to disclose was
made. More importantly, by examining how these companies prepared for
the risks associated with the disclosure may provide some insight into the
following key question: How would companies respond i f they were
required to disclose their suppher factory lists?
Tme, we carmot assume that all companies will prepare for regulated
factory disclosure in the ways that L S and Nike prepared for voluntaiy
regulation. Nevertheless, by observing the measures that these companies
took to become comfortable with factory transparency, we leam how
large, sophisticated apparel corporations manage risk, and this knowledge
is useful in assessing what sorts of responses factory disclosure regulation
might provoke in other companies.

A . U N D E R S T A N D I N G N I K E ' S D E C I S I O N T O D I S C L O S E ITS G L O B A L
FACTORY LIST

In a now famous speech to the National Press Club in the spring of 1998,
Phil Knight, CEO of Nike conceded that "the Nike product has become
synonymous with slave wages, forced overtime, and arbitrary abuse".'^
He was using the speech to introduce new initiatives that Nike hoped
J. Cushman, Nike Pledges to End Child Labor and Increase Safety, New York Times,
May 13, 1998, Intemational Business
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would stall the onslaught of negative publicity the company had endured
over the past decade for the conditions of work in their global supplier
factories. Knight told the audience that consumers do "not want to buy
products made in abusive conditions."
Those words reflected an important transformation at Nike that occurred
during the 1990s. Nike's business model has, since its earliest days in the
1970s, been based on global outsourcing to low cost jurisdictions—first to
Japanese contractors, then in the 1980s to Korea, Thailand, China, and
Taiwan, and later to Indonesian and Vietnam. It has used its own
production facilities at various times in its history, but this is the exception
to the general rale that Nike is a design and marketing company.
Production is outsourced to hundreds of contractor factories dispersed
globally.
For decades, Nike's position on its responsibility for labor conditions in its
contractor's factories was that it had no responsibility. John Woodman, a
senior Nike employee in Indonesian expressed this sentiment in 1991,
when he told a reporter that it was "not within our scope to investigate"
conditions of work in contractor factories.'*" This was a common attitude,
not only at Nike, but within industry generally. In the 1990s, however, the
interests of various private actors—labor activists, unions, human rights
and religious NGOs, and investigative journalists—converged on the
unlikely subject of factory conditions within the supply chains of global
corporations. Nike, perhaps more so than any other company, became the
target of these campaigns.
Media images of children sewing Nike soccer balls and ranning shoes
juxtaposed against the millions of dollars Nike paid sports celebrities to
market their products proved an effective formula for a new generation of
social activists who exploited the internet in a global anti-Nike
campaign.'*' Nike's traditional line denying responsibility for conditions in
R. Barnet & J. Cavanagh, Global Dreams: Imperial Corporations and the New World
Order (Simon and Schuster, 1994) . See also D. Katz, Just Do It: The Nike Spirit in the
Corporate World (Random House, 1994) (quoting a Nike official: "We don't pay anyone
in the factories, and we don't set policy within the factory: it is their business to ran.")
Some of the campaigns targeting Nike are reviewed in D, Murphy & D. Mathew, Nike
and Global Labor Practices (unpublished paper, Jan. 2001) (on file with author) and R.
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contractor factories quickly proved untenable to a growing number of
skeptical shoppers. Nike's Vice President of Labor Compliance during the
mid-1990s reflected on the company's early reactions to the corporate
campaigns as follows:
Nike made a real mistake. I think we reacted negatively to the
criticism. We said, wait a minute, we've got the best corporate
values in the world, so why aren't you yelling at the other folks.
That was a stupid thing to do and didn't get us anywhere. I f
anything it raised the volume louder."*^
A new strategy was needed to deflect the growing criticism, which by the
early 1990's, Nike executives began to perceive as a threat to their brand
image.
1. LABOR COMPLIANCE & THE MANAGEMENT OF SUPPLY CHAIN RISK

a. The Nike Code of Conduct
Nike's first reaction was to treat the growing public criticism as a public
relations and communications problem. In 1991, the company hired Dusty
Kidd, a journalist, to be its new PR Director. One ofthe first things Kidd
did, working with
senior
representatives from Production,
Communications, and Legal, was draft a new code of conduct for Nike.
Nike's Code of Conduct was released in 1992 and was modeled loosely on
Levi Strauss's Guidelines, which had been released earlier that year.''^
The new Code committed Nike publicly to accepting at least some

Locke, The Promise and Perils of GlobaUzation: The Case of Nike (unpublished paper)
(on file with author).
'^^ David F. Murphy, David Mathew, Nike and Global Labor Practices: A case study
prepared for the New Academy of Business Innovation Network for Socially Responsible
Business (unpubhshed paper, January 2001) http://www.newacademy.ac.uk/publications/keypubhcations/documents/nikereport.pdf, at 7 (quoting
Dusty Kidd, PR Director, Nike).
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responsibility for what happens in its supplier factories.
The Code
described a set of labor standards that it expected its contractors to apply,
but it did not describe precisely how compliance would be monitored, nor
did it include any commitment by Nike to disclose what factories it used
or information about the results of monitoring.
The Code was initially implemented by the Production Departments
within the different business units (Apparel, Footwear). However, the
Production personnel were neither trained as labor experts nor especially
focused on the Code's implementation.'*^ The Code was distributed to
factory owners, with an instmction to sign the document, to comply with
it, to post it in the factory, and to report to Nike on its compliance biannually. However, Nike did not initially monitor comphance in any
systematic way.
By 1996, Nike had decided that the introduction of their Code had so far
won them little public goodwill. That year, it introduced a new Labor
Practices Department, and assigned Dusty Kidd to lead it. The new
Department would assume the primary fimction of implementing and
monitoring the Code. Nike also decided to use external auditors to
monitor compliance with its Code. It first used the accounting firm Ernst
& Young. However, after a scathing report by Dara O'Rourke, who
described how the firm sent inexperienced auditors who failed to notice or
report clear violations of local laws and the Nike Code'*^, Nike switched to
Price Waterhouse Cooper (PWC). It instracted PWC to develop a user's
manual for monitoring compliance in its global factories.'*''
Nike's SHAPE intemal monitoring system was introduced in 1997. The
SHAPE audit was general in nature and intended to provide the company
with a quick survey of the general conditions of a factory. Its purpose
The Code of Conduct is available on-line at:
http://www.nike.com/nikebiz/nikebiz.jhtml?page=25&cat=code#code
""^ Muiphy, supra note 42, at 6.
D. O'Rourke, Smoke from a Hired Gun: A Critique of Nike's Labor and
Environmental Auditing in Vietnam as Performed by Ernst and Young (1997)
http://nature.berkeley.edu/orourke/PDF/smoke.pdf
Murphy, supra note 42, at 6.
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was to provide Nike witli an initial assessment of whether the factory was
at least in the ballpark in terms of a potential supplier that could satisfy the
Code of Conduct. While the SHAPE audit was therefore not a good
indication of whether the Code was actually being complied with on a
daily basis, it did have the benefit of introducing a formalized system in
which Nike personnel were required to open a SHAPE file for each
factory. In other words, it facilitated an impoitant new record keeping
process at Nike specifically related to labor compliance.
b. The Global Factory Database
In 1998, Nike created a Corporate Responsibility and Compliance
Division ("CRD"), and it named Maria Eitel as the first CRD VicePresident. CRD houses several Departments, including Compliance
(headed by Dusty Kidd) and Considered, which is intended to facilitate the
integration of corporate responsibility issues throughout the business by
bringing together sustainability and compliance people working within the
various Nike product groups. Considered reports to the VP of CRD, but
also to the heads of the product lines (Apparel, Footwear) as a means of
coordinating compliance issues. When the CRD was initially created, it
reported directly to Communications, suggesting that corporate
responsibility issues remained principally a concem of public relations.
That reporting relationship ended around 2004, and now CRD reports
directly to the CEO.
Within the Compliance Department, there are four Field Managers
assigned to Nike's regions:
the Americas, South Asia (Thailand,
Indonesia, Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka, Malaysia) North Asia (China,
Vietnam, Cambodia, Taiwan, Korea), and EMEA (Europe, Middle East,
and Africa). These Managers are responsible for monitoring the day to
day oversight of factory compliance with labor laws and the Nike Code of
Conduct, as well local stakeholder engagements. The Field Managers
work in offices within their regions, and have assigned to them
Comphance Field Staff. There are today approximately 75 full-time
employees working in Compliance, about 50 of whom are Field Staff,
whose job it is to visit the supplier factories, conduct audits, and enter their
reports into Nike's global factory database.
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That database was created in the early 2000's to help Nike's Head Office
track its global supply chain and to enable access to the various SHAPE
and other audits being conducted in the field. The various Sourcing offices
had kept their own production databases for some time to track order
information like delivery times, quality, and other specifications.
However, about five years ago, a model was developed that would allow
the Compliance Department to access information regarding labor
practices at each supplier factory, as explained by Caitlin Morris:
What makes Compliance unique is that we're the only place
currently in the company that has visibility to everybody's
individual sourcing database, and the way we use it is, when a
factory enters the system, once the factory has been approved in
the [New Source Approval Process], and compliance is the last
step in that, it gets a file created in our database. The second thing
that happens is all the auditors in the field are uploading data
information about the factories into the database. So when I mn a
report, 1 can see when the factory was last visited by an auditor,
what the findings were, what did they resolve, what was our
discussion with the business unit about umesolved factory issues,
and so its kind of a mmiing table.
The content of the information in the database has been improved by the
introduction of additional intemal audit systems at Nike, which
complement the more general SHAPE audits and the occasional extemal
audits conducted under the auspices of the FLA or even the WRC.
In 2003, Nike began using a multi-step factory compliance model they
named the "New Source Approval Process". Every factory must still pass
a basic SHAPE inspection, but approximately 25-33 percent of Nike
factories also now undergo a more comprehensive "M-Audit". The M Audit has been conducted by intemal Nike Compliance staff since Nike
terminated its relationship with PWC several years ago.''^ Nike performs a
Nike stopped using Price Waterhouse Cooper in 2002. PWC had been highly criticized
for its foray into labor monitoring, most notably in a 2000 repoit prepared again by
O'Rourke, who after accompanying PWC auditors to factories supplying Nike and other
companies described how the auditors simply ignored or missed serious labor problems
in the factories. See D. O'Rourke, Monitoring the Monitors: A Critique of PWC Labor
Monitoring (2000), http://nature.berkeley.edu/orourke/PDF/pwc.pdf
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"risk assessment" on its supplier factories, and focuses its auditing
resources on factories found to be in relatively high risk of noncompliance.''^ Factories are ranked between A and D, with D being the
highest risk. Factories that fail either a SHAPE, or a M-Audit inspection
are either not approved, or are permitted an opportunity to implement a
Master Action Plan, which will set out what the factory needs to do to be
accepted as a Nike contractor.
In practice, since each factory, and indeed each issue, is assigned a risk
ranking (A to D ) , Compliance officials in the Beaverton headquarters
focus on high risk factories and issues ("D-Rated"), while audits of low
risk factories will occur less frequently. With respect to D-Rated issues
and factories, senior Head Office Compliance personnel meet monthly
with Nike Apparel representatives to discuss the status of remediation
efforts and whether to reclassify the factory or terminate the relationship i f
improvements are not being made.
Thus, Head Office in Oregon can now view the status of any factory in the
world as of the most recent audit. Discussions between Compliance and
Sourcing will also occur on an ad hoc basis as issues arise. Compliance
and Sourcing personnel share regional offices, so they are physically in the
same space. When Compliance Field Staff discover labor compliance
problems in a factory, they will report this to the Sourcing agent with
responsibility over the factory, and the infonnation may be entered into
the factory database, where it can be accessed by senior Compliance staff.
Sometimes labor practice problems are brought to the attention of Nike by
NGOs. In that case, a compliance officer in the region will be sent to
investigate and will then report to the Regional Compliance Field
Manager. I f a problem is confirmed, a plan of action will be discussed
locally by the Sourcing team and the Compliance Field Manager, and the
information will be passed on to the Director of Labor Compliance, and
then, depending upon the seriousness of the matter, to Hannah Jones, VP
CRD, to the Legal Department, and the heads of business units to discuss.

The factors considered in the risk assessment are hsted no Nike's website. They
include the country and region, past history of comphance, nature of work and size of the
workforce.
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In relation to very serious issues, such as a death of a worker in one its
supplier factories, the information vrould be conveyed up the ladder very
quickly, probably within a day.^"
2. THE M O V E TOWARDS FACTORY DISCLOSURE AT NIKE

a. Nike and Extemal Engagement
Nike's participation in the 1997-98 AIP process, and its subsequent
involvement with the Fair Labor Association forced Nike to engage in
ongoing dialogue with extemal stakeholders and NGOs, something Nike
had not actively pursued in the past. Its gradual movement towards
greater engagement with external actors was influenced by the hiring of
Maria Eitel, who became Nike's first CRD Vice President in 1998, and its
point person on the FLA participation. Like Hannah Jones, her successor
in this position, Eitel had worked previously in community affairs at
Microsoft. Eitel was more open to engaging with Nike's critics than
previous Nike executives, and the AIP was an important early opportunity
for her to tentatively reach out to NGOs and even unions.^' Unfortunately
for Nike, the unions involved with the AIP withdrew, with the effect that
the newly created FLA lacked credibility amongst many of Nike's critics,
including the burgeoning student movement.
Nike, and its CEO Phil Knight, assumed the point position in a very public
campaign to persuade universities to support the FLA rather than the
USAS model and the WRC. Nike walked away from lucrative supplier
contracts with Brown University and Michigan when those schools
announced their intention to support the USAS rather than the FLA. To
be fair, Nike's objection to the USAS and the WRC was not limited to
factory disclosure and transparency; the absence of industry representation
was probably Nike's major concem, along with the complaint-based
investigation model of the WRC, which Nike characterized as a "gotcha"
process aimed at embarrassing apparel companies. Indeed, in March 1999,
Nike made a surprise offer to 34 of its university business partners to
disclose its factories supplying university apparel, but only in the unlikely
Intei-view with Caitlin Morris.
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event that all of its competitors did the same, and on condition that the
universities join the F L A . ^ ^
In truth, Nike's initial reaction to the idea of public factory disclosure was,
like that of most other apparel companies, hostile. It adopted the common
mantra of the apparel industry at the time: that this information was
proprietary intellectual property and that disclosing it would mean handing
over to its competitors a cmcial strategic business advantage.^'' Nike had
other concems at the time too that discouraged company officials to speak
publicly about conditions in their suppher factories. In 1998, it was sued
by Marc Kasky for making false claims in its advertising materials about
the treatment of workers in its supplier factories.^'' That lawsuit hngered
over the company until 2003, when it was settled out of court on grounds
that included a relatively meagre payment of $1.5 million dollars to the
FLA.

Nevertheless, in October 1999, Nike disclosed the 41 factories (in 11
countries) used in university apparel production to avoid losing its share of
the university apparel market, then constituting approximately 1 percent of
its total business and nearly 10 percent of its total factory supplier list.
Critics challenged Nike to go further, and to disclose its entire factory list,
but the company refiised, arguing that: "We're definitely giving our
competitors an advantage with this, but we figured it was appropriate for
the intellectual property at stake, so we're still taking the position that
there's important business reasons why we don't want to disclose the
factory list."^^ Nike perceived the disclosure as a necessary risk to
^ J. Manning, Nike Treads on a Limb With a Promise of Disclosure, The Oregon, Mar.
12 1999 (Ebenshade has noted that Nike's proposal was perceived cynically by the
student activists, "as a bride to bring the university code movement into a forum Nike
could to some extent control.")
M. Gillen, The Apparel Industry Partnership's Free Labor Association: A Solution to
the Overseas Sweatshop Problem or the Emperor's New Clothes?, 32 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. &
Pol. 1059,1097, note 138 (2000).
For discussion of this case, see W. Eldridge, Just Do It: Kasky V. Nike, Inc. Illustrates
That It Is Time To Abandon The Commercial Speech Doctrine, 12 Geo. Mason L. R.
179, (2003).
Nike Website, 2000 FAQ. The link was not active when checked again in November
2007. Original content on file with author.
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maintain a small but important market, but the risk was somewhat offset
by the fact that the company had already been treating the factories
supplying the university market as relatively high risk, so that
proportionately more attention had been paid to those factories than to the
database as a whole.^^
Thus, by the turn ofthe century, Nike had disclosed a portion of its factory
list, and had agreed to a limited number of extemal, independent audits of
its factories by way of its participation in the FLA and the WRC model.
This very subtle shift towards transparency and extemal engagement
carried over into the new millennium. In July 2000, Nike became one of
the first corporations to support the United Nation's Global Compact, an
initiative that asks companies to report on their efforts to ensure
compliance in their factories with a set of core labor standards.
That same summer, Nike introduced an initiative called "Transparency
101", through which it announced it would begin posting on its website
the results of audits done by PWC of some of its factories (although
without identifying particular factories). Vada Manager, Nike's Director
of Global Issues at that time explained:
We needed a defence against investigations into our factories from
outside forces. It's a way to pre-empt nongovernmental
organizations and the media from playing 'gotcha.' For us, that
level of transparency was necessary and appropriate to send the
message that we have nothing to hide.^^
In November 2000, Nike joined CERES, an environmental sustainability
NGO that calls on companies to engage external stakeholders on
environmental issues and to publicly report, using the Global Reporting
Inhiative, on environmental issues.^^
' Interview witli Caitlin Morris.
" S. Van Yoder, Beware the Coming Coiporate Backlash 250 (5) Industry Week 38
(2001) (quoting Vada Manager, Director of Global Issues, Nike).
See CERES, Sustainable Reporting, http://www.ceres.org/sustreporting/ (last visited
Nov. 3, 2007).
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Thus, the rhetoric of transparency and stakeholder engagement was
ubiquitous at Nike in 2000. The following year, Nike introduced a
Corporate Responsibility Committee on its Executive Board which was
assigned the role of overseeing the company's social performance in areas
such as labor, the environment, and charitable endeavours. Also in 2 0 0 1 ,
it released its first Corporate Social Responsibility Report^^, which
included information about the number of factories it used in each country,
the number of employees per country, average wages, again by country,
and other information set out in general terms on national basis. In April
2002, the FLA announced new public reporting requirements. It would
henceforth disclose information from its audits that would identify the
member company that sources from the audited factory, the country in
which the factory is located, the size of the workforce, the date of the
audit, the name of the auditor, summaries of areas of compliance and noncompliance, and summaries of remediation p l a n s . W h i l e this new model
still did not disclose the specific factory the audit report refers to, it would
produce sufficient information for knowledgeable labor organizations to
identify this information in many cases.^'
In June 2003, Nike became the first company to sign the legally binding
"Sports and Corporate Wear Ethical Clothing Deed" requiring it to
disclose to the Textile, Clothing, and Footwear Union of Australia the
suppliers it uses in Australia and the price Nike pays for the items made by
those supphers.^^ The Deed also grants the union the right to review the
suppliers' books, permitting the Union to confirm that the national
arbitration award is being properly implemented.

' Available on-line at: http://www.nike.com/nikebiz/nikebiz.jhtml?page=29&item=ly01
^° See Maquila Solidarity Network, Memo: Codes Update, No 10 (April 2002),
http://www.maquilasolidarity.org/sites/maquilasolidarity.org/files/codesmemolO 0.PDF.
Interview with Bob Jeffcott, Maquila Solidarity Network, Toronto, 2006.
See Press Release, Nike and the Textile, Clothing and Footwear Union of Australia,
Nike
and
TCFUA
Sign
Ethical
Clothing Deed
(June
25,
2003),
http://www.cleanclothes.org/companies/nike03-08-15.htm. Only about 400 workers were
making Nike products in Australia at the time.
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Therefore, with factory disclosure under the WRC, the new reporting
requirements under the FLA and the Australian Deed, voluntary reporting
under Transparency 1 0 1 , and the many ongoing independent
investigations of Nike supplier factories by NGO's, Nike's supposed
secret global factory list was becoming less of a secret everyday. Nike
also continued to expand its efforts to engage with extemal stakeholders.
In 2003, it introduces a new position within Labor Compliance, Director
of Integration and Collaboration, and it moved Caithn Morris from the
Communications Division into this position. A central function of Morris'
new job was to engage and collaborate with various extemal stakeholders,
including NGOs and competitors in issues relating to labor compliance.

B . T H E D E C I S I O N TO D I S C L O S E T H E C O M P L E T E F A C T O R Y L I S T

Then, in a move that would ultimately push Nike towards full factory
disclosure, Nike invited a panel of extemal experts to review a draft of its
2 0 0 4 Corporate Responsibility Report. The group, known formally as the
Nike Report Review Committee ("Review Committee"), included Neil
Keamey, the General Secretary of the International Textile, Garment and
Leather Workers Federation and one of Nike's harshest critics.^' The
Review Committee was asked to comment on: ( 1 ) Materiality (does the
information in the report address those issues of most concem to Nike
extemal stakeholders); (2) Completeness (does the report display that Nike
has a complete understanding of the impacts of its activities); and ( 3 )
Responsiveness (does the report indicate that Nike is listening to and
responding to stakeholder concerns).*'* It met in September 2 0 0 4 (in
Boston) and again in Febmary 2005 (in London) to review drafts of the
Nike CR 2 0 0 4 Report, and then presented Nike with a list of suggestions
and recommendations.

For a list of the Committee members, see Nike, Corporate Responsibility Report
(2004), http://www.nike.eom/nikebiz/gc/r/Iy04/docs/FY04_Nike_CR repoit_full.pdf at
14.
""^ Id., at 14.
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Neil Keamey strongly advocated for one of the recommendations. He
believed that Nike would not receive the kind of credit it craved from the
NGO community unless it released the names and addresses of its entire
factory database.*^ The Review Committee's recommendations, including
factory disclosure, were presented by Hannah Jones, who had replaced
Eitel as VP CRD in 2004, to Phil Knight and other Nike executives in the
early months of 2005. The executives sent it back to the Corporate
Responsibility Division with instmctions to consider a "landscape
analysis", an assessment of the potential costs and benefits of full factory
disclosure.
The perceived risks were easy enough to identify. There were concems
within the business that factory disclosure would facilitate a wave of NGO
activism and media coverage targeting Nike supplier factories for
investigation, and that unions would target the factories for organizing
campaigns.
There was also a concem within some parts of the
organization that competitors could use the information to the
disadvantage of Nike, perhaps by moving into the Nike factories and
thereby eroding the factory's capacity to supply for Nike. However, the
situation was also considerably different than it was just a decade earlier.
For one thing, Nike now had some experience with factory disclosure.
About 100 of its factories had been published on the WRC website for
several years, and the company had not experienced any noticeable
negative repercussions.
Nike executives also had more confidence in their monitoring abilities
than in years past. It had implemented both SHAPE and M-Audits, it had
several years' experience with FLA audits and reporting, it had a
dedicated Labor Compliance Department and Compliance Field team that
regularly reported back to Sourcing and Head Office, and it had now a
global factory database with a fairly robust system for updating reports
about each factory. In short, there was a feeling within the company that it
had a better sense of what was going on in its supplier factories than in
years past. There was also a belief, at least among the CR people at Nike,
that the defensive strategy that had Nike battling media reports and NGOs

Interview with Neil Kearney, General Secretaiy, International Textile, Garment and
Leather Workers Federation, Toronto, 2006.
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investigations one factory at a time in isolation from other brands was not
a realistic strategy going forward, particularly in apparel.
Apparel accounts for roughly one-third of Nike's business, but comprises
the vast majority (579 in 2 0 0 1 ) of its 750 supplier factories (compared to
equipment (89 factories) and footwear (68) divisions).** On the apparel
side, Nike is often only one of many brands in a factory and, in many
instances, it is not even the factory's major customer. This limits Nike's
ability to pressure labor comphance issues and to track what is happening
in the factories at any given time.*'' By 2005, Nike C R executives were
talking a lot about the need for industry "collaboration" to monitor and
address labor practice issues in the apparel industry.
They knew that, in fact, compliance officers from the many companies in
the industry had been speaking with one another informally for years
about conditions in shared factories. There was less secrecy about factory
location within the apparel industry than many in the industry let on.
Moreover, because of the phasing out of the Multi-Fibre Agreement in
2005, the company anticipated that apparel would begin to consolidate in
the way that footwear had, towards fewer factories and longer term
relationships. In that environment, there would be even less secrecy about
which companies were using which factories that there was today.

There are various reasons for the proliferation of apparel factories, including different
tariff and trade laws regulating the various industries, and the fact that apparel
manufacturing is highly labor intensive and extremely sensitive to constantly changing
fashion trends. See discussion in Locke, supra note 41, at 8-10. The Agreement on
Textile and Clothing (the Multi-Fibre Agreement) governed trade in textiles between
1974 and Januaiy 1, 2005, when it was phased out.
" See, e.g., Locke, supra note 41, at 9 ("Nike works with numerous suppliers, most of
whom are also working for other (often competitor) companies. Given that different
apparel suppliers specialize in particular products or market segments, shifts in consumer
preferences or fashion trends could translate into very short-term contracts with and/or
limited orders from Nike. This alters both the level of influence which Nike has with
these suppliers as well as its ability to monitor on a regular basis the production processes
and working conditions of these factories.").
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Thus, as the Nike CR executives prepared their landscape analysis of the
risks and benefits of full factory disclosure, "collaboration" became a key
theme on the benefits side of the ledger. Caitlin Morris explains:
It's not that there is no business risk [from factory disclosure], but
that the business risk relative to the benefits of collaboration is far
lower, and there is a perception that the business risk is also
mitigated by the fact that how we do business with factories,
particularly in apparel, is different from how we did it ten years
ago.
As this whole concept of longer term relationships,
consolidated supply chains, et cetera... i f you're not doing the
traditional, everyone's cashing for the lowest price, and you're
trying to offer a more robust partnership or value to factory
owners, then it's a little less of a corporate secret where you are,
because you are not so worried about people coming in and
stealing your capacity.
The belief within the CR group that a more effective strategy going
forward would encourage industry collaboration about conditions and
remediation in shared factories drove the company's decision to make fiill
factory disclosure in its 2 0 0 4 CR Report, as Morris explains:
If you're on average 10 to 15 percent in an apparel factory, 10 or
15 percent of that factory's volume, it's pretty hard to make change
on your own. So i f we really were serious about making change
we were going to have to team up with other brands in a concerted
way. So I would say the collaboration strategy came first, and
flowing from the collaboration strategy was [the idea that] its
going to be hard to collaborate if we don't know where we are, and
that sort of drove transparency.
In the end, the arguments in favor of full factoiy disclosure were perceived
by the Nike leadership to offset lingering concerns that the disclosure
would harm the company.
The list was released in April 2005 and included all factories producing
Nike branded items, but not Nike subsidiaries.
This amounts to
approximately 90 percent of Nike's supplier factories.
In its
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need

for industry

Our industry is at a crossroads. Individual companies, Nike
included, now realize there are limits to what we can achieve
independently. By being open with this list, and by providing the
depth and breath of information in our CR report, we hope it will
encourage others to join collaborative efforts.*'
In the months that followed Nike's surprise disclosure, several of its
leading competitors followed, including Adidas, Timberland, Puma, and
Levi-Strauss, which is examined in the next section.

C. U N D E R S T A N D I N G L E V I - S T R A U S S ' D E C I S I O N T O D I S C L O S E ITS
GLOBAL FACTORY LIST

In 1975, Levi-Strauss ("LS") drafted a Code of Internadonal Business
Principles, which included a commitment to "operating well above the
minimum legal standard such that [the company's] conduct is and
intentions are above question", and it included also a commitment
respecting the treatment of workers: "The company subscribes to a single
global philosophy of fair treatment of employees that is also consistent
with local laws and practices." Consistent with the approach to codes at
the time, the 1975 Code apphed only to LS's own operations, not to its
contractors. The promise to comply with local laws was also so a
common feature of 1970s' corporate codes, But LS's code seemed to go
one step further by indicating that compliance with laws was in addition to
its promise to treat workers "fairly", and "well above the minimum legal
standard".
These sorts of lofty statements of social responsibihty are a common
feature in the history of LS. For most of the 20"^ century, LS enjoyed a
relatively favored position amongst major American apparel companies in
terms of its public reputation. Its reputation as a decent "coiporate citizen"
is usually traced back to its founder. Levi Strauss built the company from
On-line at: http://www.nike.coni/nikebiz/nikebiz.jhtml?page=25&cat=activefactories
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a small operation with an interesting patented denim pant using a rivet into
one of America's most iconic corporations. He was a significant
philanthropist, and stories about his fair treatment of workers abound as
historical anecdotes.*^
The family heirs to the company, notably the Haas family, are similarly
credited with maintaining a "do good" philosophy that permeated the
management levels ofthe organization. Famously, in the 1950s, Walter
and Peter Haas defied Virginian politicians and social norms by refusing
to segregate black and white workers in their factories, a story that is still
highlighted on the corporate website.'" When the company went public in
1971, its prospectus made explicit reference to the "social responsibihties"
of the company, according to Walter Haas, as a way of waming investors
"that they weren't going to change".^' The descendants of Levi Strauss
took the company private again in 1985, "hop[ing] to revive the
company's history of value-based decision-making."'^

1. THE BUSINESS PARTNER TERMS OF ENGAGEMENT AND GUIDELINES FOR
COUNTRY SELECTION

However, its reputation for corporate decency did not shield L S from
criticism when it began outsourcing its American production to foreign
contractors in great quantities beginning in the late 1980s. In 1990, L S
shut down one of its factories in Texas and shifted production to a
contractor in Costa Rica, leading to the layoff of over 1000 employees in
Levi Strauss' personal and business history is recounted in a number of books,
including Karl Schoenberger , Levi's Children: Coming to Terms with Human Rights in
the Global Marketplaces (Grove/Atlantic, 2002). As recounted by Schoenberger, his
record as an employer was not impeccable: "like many other employers in North America
in the late 1800s, he refiised to hire Chinese workers, and he employed young girls in his
factories and required them to work long hours in dangerous conditions" (at 35).
™ Id. at 32.

L. Compa, T. Hinchliffe-Darricarrere, Enforcing Intemational Labor Rights Through
Corporate Codes of Conduct, 33 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 663, 675 (1995).

40

C L P E RESEARCH PAPER SERIES

[ V O L . 0 4 No. 0 1

San Antonio. Tliis move sparked a campaign against LS by the laid-off
employees, v^^ho were mostly woman of Mexican origin, v^^hich turned into
a public relations nightmare for LS, as explained by Schoenberger:
Some of these disgmntled former employees formed a militant
labor group named Fuerza Unida and were still fighting back a
decade later. The group launched a strident protest campaign with
lawsuits, hunger strikes, demonstrations, and appeals for a boycott
of Levi's products. Leader Irene Reynes wanted that the scorned
... workers would become Levis' "worst nightmare". Reynes and
the other leaders journeyed from Texas to Levi Plaza ... and
chained themselves to the front doors of corporate headquarters to
draw attention to their cause...
[To] Levi's executives spying
down from the dark-tinted windows of their handsomely brownpanelled office buildings at Levi Plaza, the scene has tro have been
painful to watch. Proud and aloof, Levi Strauss had very little
experience being publicly vilified.''
In the one year period from 1991 and 1992, the percentage of LS products
made by contractors jumped from 35 to 54 percent.''' And many of these
contractors were overseas, in developing economies.
For companies like LS, which sought to protect a brand image as a
corporate social leader, the decision in the 1990s to move most of its
production offshore, introduced significant new risks. One response was
to revisit its global code of conduct and to update it for a new era in which
the supply chain was considerably more global in scope and a global labor
activist movement—that now included the media, human rights
organizations, unions, church groups, and various other NGOs—had
emerged which, with the use of the intemet, had become extremely
effective at discovering labor abuses and reporting them pubhcly in the
form of damaging corporate campaigns.
Therefore, in September 1991, LS created a 14 member Sourcing
Guidelines Working Group to develop a new set of guidelines for their
Schoenberger, supra note 69, at 49.
Id. at 56.
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global supply contractors.
The resulting Business Partner Terms of
Engagement and Guidelines for Country Selection (Guidelines) was
approved by LS's Executive Management Committee in March 1992.'^
With the new Guidelines, LS once again positioned itself as a leader in
corporate responsibility by becoming the first multinational apparel
company to confirm in writing its responsibility for labor practices in
factories owned or controlled by its contractors.
The Guidelines included two parts, one applying to the selection of
countries and the other setting standards expected of contractors. The
content of the Guidelines was quite specific in terms of employment
practices. It addressed child labor, prison and forced labor, wages and
benefits, discrimination, and disciphnary practices. It also included a
system of intemal monitoring and unannounced audits, a tiered approach
to resolution of problems, and the possibility for cancellation of orders for
non-compliance.'*
In explaining the need for the Guidelines, the company emphasized the
risks associated with sourcing from abusive foreign employers:
As we expand our sourcing base to more diverse cultures and
countries, we must take special care in selecting business partners
and countries whose practices are not incompatible with our
values. Otherwise, sourcing decisions could end up damaging the
image of our brands and threatening our commercial success.
In the early days of the new Guidelines, the company announced it would
stop contracting from Burma because of the country's human rights
abuses, and it terminated contracts with more than 30 contractors in
countries including Saipan, Honduras, Uraguay, and the Philippines for
non-compliance." Early reviews by NGOs of LS's behavior under its
Compa, supra note 72, at 676-77.
The LS Guidelines were criticized for not expressly including the right to form and join
unions or a right to collective bargaining, although it did include a broad statement noting
that employees have a "right to free association", which the company asserted implied a
right to collective bargaining. In later versions of the Guidelines, the right to "form and
join organizations of their choice and to bargain collectively" was added.
Compa, supra note 72, at 678.
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new code were generally favorable. It received accolades from many in
the NGO community when in 1993 it announced dramatically that it
would not source from China due to concerns about human rights abuses
there, becoming the first American apparel company to adopt a "no
China" position on the basis of human rights practices.
However, when the company later reversed that position in 1998, it was
thmst back into the stoiTn of coiporate campaigns targeting labor practices.
In a newspaper editorial in the summer of 1998, Medea Benjamin of the
NGO Global Exchange challenged L S to be a leader in China, and to start
by: "disclosing which subcontractor factories it will work with and what
the wages and human rights conditions are in those factories", because
"disclosure [was] critical to lifting the veil of secrecy under which many
U.S. companies operate in China."'^ L S did in fact disclose its global
factory database, however not until October 2005. What happened at L S
to cause its executives to make this information public?
2. THE CENTRAL FACTORY DATABASE

As with Nike, an important part of the story of factory disclosure at L S
begins years prior to the actual disclosure, in incremental processes
implemented by the company that created management confidence that
factory disclosure would not harm the company. When L S introduced its
Guidelines in 1991, it was sourcing from about 700 factories worldwide.
There was no separate department created to manage the Guidelines.
Responsibility for overseeing the Guidelines fell initially to Coiporate
Affairs, but it was the sourcing and quality control people in the actual
regions where the factories were located that were expected to introduce
their contractors to the Guidelines and to monitor compliance issues.
These people were not labor experts, and the Company did not start hiring
full-time internal monitors until the mid-1990s. Nor did L S inidally retain
outside auditing firms to monitor compliance with the Guidelines. Thus,
while the Guidelines were an important symbolic commitment to labor
rights in its supplier factories, there was is the early years very little
internal infrastmchire in place to ensure its effective implementation. The
M . Benjamin, A Riveting Announcement, San Francisco Guardian, June 10, 1998.
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company sent teams of intemal auditors to conduct annual audits of the
factories. It announced that the first round of audits found 95 percent of
its supplier factories to be in compliance with the Guidelines or in need of
relatively minor improvements.'^ Contracts with 5 percent of factories
were cancelled for non-compliance.
Prior to 1993, LS did not maintain a global factory database. No one at
the San Francisco head office knew for sure how many factories were
being used or where those factories were located. Sourcing issues were
decentralized, delegated to the various regional offices. Thus, someone at
the Asian sourcing office would know what factories were in use in Asia
at any given time, subject to sub-contracting by the contractors about
which the LS staff may not be aware. However, the Asian sourcing
people would not know what factories were being used in the Americas,
for example, and Head Office did not compile a master list. However, in
1993, as the company accumulated auditing reports from the first wave of
audits under the Guidelines, a decision was made to create a single, central
global database listing every factory sourcing LS product.
The database was built up over time, with audit results being inputted as
they were completed. This process was aided considerably when, in
approximately 1995, LS hired full-time Regional Managers for Europe,
the Americas, and Asia, who were assigned the task of managing labor
compliance issues and keeping the database current.
Thereafter,
throughout the mid and late 1990s, LS hired teams of internal factory
assessors, who also were posted at the various regional offices. Today,
there are 20 LS employees working full-time doing factory assessments,
plus additional assessors who are not employees of LS, but who have been
approved by LS after completing a week long monitoring program taught
by LS officials.^"

Shoenberger, supra note 699, at 64.
^° Most of these extemal assessors are employed by independent auditing organizations.
LS does not approve entire firms or organizations because, according to Kobori, quality
varies considerably among individuals. Therefore, LS issues approvals of external
auditors only on an individual basis.
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Today, the LS assessors and the Regional Managers are situated in the
Code of Conduct Department, which was established in 2000, and is
currently headed by Michael Kobori. Kobori works from the company's
San Francisco Head Office and holds the title Vice-President, Global Code
of Conduct. The three Regional Managers report to Kobori. Kobori
reports to the Senior Vice-President of Global Sourcing, which means that
the Code of Conduct Department is integrated with the business operations
and part of Global Sourcing. This reporting line has been in place since
about 2000.
The results of audits conducted by the intemal and extemal monitors are
compiled by LS officials and entered into the factory database at regular
intervals. Auditors working either for or on behalf of LS must complete a
detailed 40 page form that measures a factory's compliance with the
Guidelines as a precondition for LS adding the factory as a supplier. That
information is then entered in the central global database, which can be
accessed by sourcing staff, other auditors engaged by LS, and LS
executives and employees in the Corporate Code of Conduct department.
Thus, since the late 1990s, as at Nike, LS officials at Head Office have
been able to instantly access a complete factory database that includes a
vast array of information about labor practices in each factory and this
database in being regularly updated by factory assessors whose job it is to
visit factories.
3. THE INTERNAL INFORMATION HIGHWAY

Information about factory labor practices travels through the company in
other ways as well. Both Nike and LS acknowledged that they sometimes
learn about labor problems in their supplier factories from NGOs. Both
companies have concluded that it is in their best interest to take those
issues seriously and to investigate the allegations before they become
fodder for negative public relations campaigns. I f a complaint comes into
Kobori's office, he can instantly look up the factory in the database and
view the most up to date information about the factory's compliance
histoiy. Kobori explained how he would respond to a complaint received
at his office about an alleged violation of the LS Guidelines:
.. .my first reaction is to send that report in as much detail as I can
to the Regional Manager, who will sit with the assessor, and they'll
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go into tlie next phase of the investigation. It's a pretty standard
procedure.
Once the investigation at the factory is complete, the results w^ould usually
be entered into the database, and the NGO, or whoever first contacted the
company about the problem would receive a reply from the company.
An example of this process is described in a report prepared by the UK
based muhi-stakeholder. Ethical Trading Initiative (ETI) in 2003, which
LS joined in 1999.*' In August 2003, a group of NGOs, including the
Central America Women's Network (CAWN), the Workers Support
Centre (CAT), and Toronto-based Maquila Sohdarity Network contacted
LS about a series of incidents in a Tarrant Ajalpan factory in Puebla,
Mexico that violated LS's Guidelines. This letter officially initiated the
ETI code violation procedure. LS requested the NGOs provide it with
more information, and it sent its Regional Code of Conduct Manager to
Puebla in mid-September to meet with the CAT, the factory workers, and
the factory owners. LS requested that the owners of the factory permit an
independent audit of the factory, to be conducted by the auditing firm
Verite. That request was denied, which was itself a violation of the
Guidelines. LS also received a report on the factory prepared by the WRC
which appeared to confirm other violations of the Guidelines. LS wrote
letters to the local govemment expressing concem over the labor practices
in the factory, and finally, in October 2003, after the factory owners had
indicated it would not work with LS any longer, LS pulled its work from
the factory.
4. LEVI STRAUSS AND INDEPENDENT MONITORING

One criticism from NGOs and labor organizations that dogged LS even
after it began its factory monitoring process was its continued refusal to
permit independent monitoring and for its lack of public transparency
about audit results. For example, in 1995 and 1996, a Canadian Cathode
NGO called Development and Peace investigated factories supplying LS

Ethical Trading Initiative, Addressing Labor Rights Violations at Tarrant Ajalpan
Mexico
Using
ETI's
Complaints
Procedure
(May
2004),
http://www.ethicaltrade.Org/Z/lib/2004/05/codeviol-mex/index.shtml.
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products in Honduras and the Philippines and found various violations of
LS's Guidehnes.^^ Development and Peace collected and forwarded over
100,000 signed postcards to Robert Haas asking the company to permit
independent monitoring of the factories. The organization received a
dismissive response from the President of Levis Canada, Gordon Shank,
who asserted that LS's own employees are in the best position to monitor
comphance with the Guidelines.*^
Various other NGOs and labor activists also began to target LS and its
refusal to allow independent monitors to investigate its factories and to
publicly report back on the findings. One of the most vocal critics of LS
was the Dutch based NGO, Clean Clothes Campaign (CCC). In May 1998,
it released a lengthy and detailed report into alleged working conditions at
factories supplying LS products*'*. LS responded by challenging many of
the conclusions in the report.*^ One of the principle demands, or at least
suggestions for improvement, set out by the CCC was that, if LS wished to
preserve its image as leader in the CSR movement, it should take the next
step and permit independent monitoring and public reporting of the results
of those audits.
However, through most ofthe 1990s, LS refiised to open up its supplier
factories to outside scmtiny. In contrast to Nike, LS did not initially
participate in President Clinton's AIP initiative, which because of the
involvement of various union and church groups was widely expected to
result in a system that required some form of independent monitoring.
Development and Peace, Noveca Industries: A Case Study in the Philippines, (1996).
See also, Schoenberger, supra note 699 at 71-72; Clean Clothes Campaign, Levi Strauss
&
Company: Corporate Profde and Case Material (Apr. 30, 1998),
http://www.cleanclothes.Org/companies/levi5-5-98.htm#focus.
Id. at 72.

A point by point response was sent to the CCC by Patrick Neyts, who was then the
Director of environment, health, and safety for Levi's in Europe. The letter is not
published on either the website of the CCC or LS, however, CCC does reference the letter
and some of the Neyts responses in a subsequent reply to Neyts: Levi Strauss update from
the CCC (Dec. 22, 1998), http://www.cleanclothes.org/companies/levi98-12-22.htm.
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Shoenberger suggested that LS's refusal to participate in the AIP was in
large measure due to its "fundamental aversion to transparency".** This is
an overgeneralization. While it is certainly the case that sourcing
executives were averse to having a public spotlight shone on their supplier
factories, Patrick Neyts, head of the Code of Conduct Department in the
mid-1990s had begun making the case internally for factory disclosure as a
way to enhance and protect the corporation's reputation as an ethically
responsible company.
As noted earlier, Neyts gathered a list of a
competitor's suppher factories as a way to convince LS executives that the
company's supply chain was not a secret.*'
The FLA model that resulted from the AIP negotiations did in fact require
independent monitoring, but of only a very small percentage of supplier
factories, and while participating companies were required to disclose
their factory list to the FLA, there were strict requirements that this
information not be disclosed publicly or to other participating
companies.As it turned out, therefore, the FLA was not very threatening,
and many of LS's main competitors had signed on, including Nike,
Reebok, Phillips Van Heusen, and Liz Claiborne. LS had explained its
reflisal to participate on the basis that it saw no benefit to doing so, since
its intemal monitoring system and its Guidelines were working fine. But
in 1999, LS joined the FLA, thereby agreeing to open up its factories to
outside inspectors for the first time, albeit in a limited way. Joining the
FLA was one of several signs in the late 1990s that LS was becoming
more willing to open up its model to public scmtiny, and to engage
outsiders in the process, including NGOs and labor organizations.
As noted eariier, LS joined the ETI in 1999.** In 1998, it permitted
several NGOs to participate in a pilot project involving an assessment of
Shoenberger, supra note 69, at 221.
^' Interview with Patrick Neyts, Toronto, 2007.
LS was suspended from the ETI in December 2006 for refiising to comply with the
"living wage" requirement in the ETI's Code, and in February 2007, LS resigned from
the ETI because it felt it could not agree to this requirement. See for details. Press
Release, ETI, Resignation of Levi Strauss & Co. from ETI, (Feb. 5, 2007)
http://www.ethicaltrade.Org/Z/lib/2007/02/levistrauss2-stmt/index.shtml.
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its Guidelines and monitoring processes at a factory in the Dominican
Republic. The NGOs were permitted to interview the workers, and they
found that while the workers were generally treated decently and in
accordance with the Guidehnes and labor laws, few were aware of the
Guidelines or their legal employment rights.*^ LS made this report
public, including a comment by one NGO that LS's monitoring model
needed to be accompanied by "independent monitoring".^" Kobori later
discussed this project, including the comments of the NGOs, at a 1998
conference of the industry-based organization, Business for Social
Responsibility.
Kobori explained this gradual movement towards greater transparency in
the late 1990s as an evolutionary process based on experience:
In the mid-1990s, there was a real resistance for a lot of companies
to even having a code of conduct, to even adopting standards. And
I would say in the past 10 years...everything has changed to the
point that where i f you don't have a code of conduct, people are
asking why? I think that there was also resistance to independent
monitoring, there was a mind-set, or a perception in the industry:
"Hey, we're doing this, we know how, what do we have to leam
from anyone else?" And 1 think over the years, we and everyone
else in the industiy that does this work, we are learning as we go,
because it hasn't been done before. So there's, I think, just an
evolution back in the mid 1990s, that...there's a broader extemal
set of stake-holders here that can actually help us in doing this
work.... I don't think it was any big "ah-ha" moment. 1 thinlc it
was just a combination of factors that eventually moved companies
or caused companies to evolve their thinking in this area, to be
more dynamic, to be more open to extemal engagements.^'

Schoenberger, supra note 699, at 217-219.
Id. at 221.
Interview, Kobori, supra note 2.
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In his address to the BSR conference, Kobori encouraged business leaders
to "be completely transparenf', and not to be afraid "to take risks",
"because you might leam something that will make you better."^^
5. THE DECISION TO DISCLOSE THE FACTORY LIST

However, despite these strong sentiments in favor of transparency, the
notion of voluntarily disclosing the entire factory database was not one
being seriously considered at LS as the new century dawned. According
to Kobori, factory disclosure was recognized as one of many possibilities
that the company could explore, but it was not a move that had been
formally evaluated.
That changed in the spring of 2 0 0 5 when Nike
suddenly released their global factory database on its website. Kobori
indicated that the Nike announcement was a stimulus for serious
discussion about factory disclosure at LS.
The idea of following Nike's lead was considered at the Code of
Conduct's mid-year management meeting in the summer of 1995. The
idea of factory disclosure was then considered using a decision-making
model known as the Levi Strauss & Company Way, which required as a
first step that the idea be given serious attention as a possible course of
action, followed by a process of intelligent exploration that included
researching the "pros and cons" of factory disclosure, including by means
of discussions with competitors and other stakeholders.
One of the primary perceived benefits of factory disclosure was that it
would enable greater collaboration between brands to reduce duplication
of monitoring. According to Kobori, duplication of monitoring in the
apparel industry detracts considerably from the impoitant task of trying to
plan a strategy to address problems:
... we all began to realize, guess what, we're in shared factories,
we're all sending monitors there, suppliers are getting visited by a
monitor every two or thi-ee weeks. There's more time being spent
receiving these monitors and showing them around than actually
Schoenberger, supra note 69, at 220.
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making the improvements in the factory.... As an industry, at
best, we are spending 2 0 percent of our resources on creating the
change
that
we
need
to
be
sustainable
going
forward... [and].. .probably 80 percent of our time on monitoring.
Kobori had come to believe that it was best to "empower" the field staff,
who were out there in the factories, to move forward with the discussions
they were already having with auditors and monitors representing other
apparel companies about how to work on joint remediation plans and how
to reduce duplication of audits. Factory disclosure was perceived as a
way to do this.
Factory disclosure was presented as an idea to Sourcing and to some of the
suppliers and licensees, as well as to senior company officials.
There
was some initial resistance within Sourcing, and from some exclusive LS
licensees who claimed they did not want to be included in the list.
However, according to Kobori, most supphers were pleased to be included
on the list, because the fact that they had passed LS's Terms of
Engagement assessment was perceived as positive marketing. One
supplier called Kobori complaining that it had not been included on the
list. By early fall, 2005, LS had decided to disclose its global factory
database. The database already existed of course, and after some checking
for accuracy of names and addresses, the factory list was released publicly
in October 2005 on the company's website.^'

V. VOLUNTARY F A C T O R Y DISCLOSURE:
CONCLUSIONS, LESSONS, AND IMPACTS S O F A R . . .
At the outset of this paper, I characterized regulated factory disclosure as a
"risk vims" which, i f injected into the corporate "bloodstream" of an
apparel company, would cause the coiporation to introduce measures to

Available on-line:
http://www.levistraiiss.coni/Citizenship/ProductSourcing/Issues/FactoryNaniesAndLocati
ons.aspx
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control the risk. One objective of this paper was to explore whether there
are traits shared by companies that disclose their factory lists voluntarily
that appear to confirm the normative expectations of factory disclosure
advocates about how the disclosure virus i f introduced by regulation
would by managed by apparel companies. What have we learned about
the potential contribution of factory disclosure as a policy to improve labor
practices within global apparel supply chains?
An obvious initial observation is that both companies disclosed their
factory lists only once company officials believed it was relatively safe to
do so. To reach this point of comfort, a number of important steps had
been taken over preceding years. Firstly, both companies had introduced
codes of conduct over a decade prior to the factory disclosure. This gave
the companies time to leam and experiment with defining the content of
the code, with code monitoring and remediation, and with the various
ways in which to present information about the code to a skeptical public
and stakeholders. Both companies had experienced significant growing
pains in this process and had been targeted by NGOs in negative publicity
campaigns. However, that process enabled the companies to become
more comfortable in dealing with their critics, to the point that some
NGOs acknowledge a visible shift in the extent to which Nike and L S
have in recent years been prepared to dialogue with them and share
information about labor problems in their factories.^'*
Another key measure was the introduction of factory auditing systems.
Neither company claims the ability to monitor every factory on a regular
basis. However, audits are now sufficiently regular that, in the perception
of the companies, the risk of being caught completely unaware of abusive
labor practices in a supplier factoiy has been reduced to a tolerable level.
In addition, since senior compliance staff are now more prepared to
dialogue with NGOs when labor problems are discovered, the companies
are more confident that they will be evaluated by NGOs by their response

Discussions with Bob Jeffcott and Lynda Yanz, Maquila Solidarity Network, Toronto,
2007.
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to problems rather than merely on the basis that problems exist.
It is
relevant too that both companies primarily source their own factories
rather than use sourcing agents. This removes the step, and associated
risk, of having to depend on an intermediary to track the factories.
The creation of a global factory database was cmcial development at both
companies. This is a key moment in the risk management process not
only because it enables better tracking of events and practices in specific
factories, but also because it emphasizes to employees in sourcing,
production, and labor compliance that every factory is treated as a distinct
unit that will be monitored and measured against defined labor standards.
The introduction of a global factory database also provides a looking-glass
through which senior officials at head office can observe the goings on in
particular factories and regions. It is an important part of an information
system that enables a company to track what is happening in its supplier
factories, and it signals to field staff that they too may be monitored.
Both companies have also developed a quite robust system for gathering
and conveying information up and down the links from head office to
factory level.
This system began with the appointment of dedicated
senior level staff who are responsible for monitoring labor practices in
supplier factories. Both companies had created labor compliance
departments by the tum of the century, staffed by senior Vice Presidents
and teams of internal compliance auditors. Within the labor compliance
departments, there is also now a clear chain of command. Complaints
received from external sources alleging problems in a supplier factoiy can
now be quickly relayed from head office officials to field staff, who can

This development is reflected in the decision of the companies to disclose incidence of
non-compliance with their codes of conduct. The strategy of admitting labor problems,
but pledging to work with NGOs to plan corrective measures is a trend in the apparel
industry, at least among leading brand-based companies (including, for example. The
Gap), although one that also has not been picked up by Canadian-based apparel and retail
companies. Exceptions are MEC (see MEC, Marking Our Route: 2005 Accountability
Report,
http://images.mec.ca/media/Images/pdf/MEC__Accountability_Report vl_m5657756983
0609369.pdf) and The Hudson's Bay Company (see HBC, Monitoring Our Supply
Chain, http://www.hbc.eom/hbc/hbc_csr_eng/es_monitoring.html#AUDIT (last visited
Nov. 3, 2007).).
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then investigate the situation first-hand and relay their report back to head
office.
There are, to summarize, signs that Nike and LS introduced the sorts of
measures factory disclosure advocates andcipate will become more
common under a system of industry factory disclosure. Systems for
tracking which factories are being used, better communications system for
conveying information about labor practices in specific factories up to
responsible corporate officials, and more dynamic factory monitoring
systems were developments that occurred at both companies which
contributed to a level of comfort that by 2005 enabled factory disclosure to
occur.
Both companies also claim to support the idea of linking performance and
compensation evaluations to the comphance performance of factories,
although I heard different opinions about how this should be done and
which employees should be included. Nike places primary responsibility
for factory compliance on the Sourcing agents, since it is the Sourcing
people who the most direct business dealings with the factory owners.
However, Nike is still wrestling with how to formally incorporate labor
comphance into the evaluations of Sourcing employees.
According to Morris, there are informal pressures on Sourcing agents to
bring their factories into comphance. For example, i f a factory remains
"D-Rated" for a number of months, this will drive "a pressure
conversation" in which the agent is asked, "what are you doing about this
factory, and why are we still with them?" Nike would like to develop a
human resource strategy that more formally incorporates labor compliance
into the evaluations of Sourcing personnel. Moms noted, however, that
doing so is a challenge because the company recognizes that there are
"root causes" for non-compliance that are often completely out of the
control of Sourcing personnel.^* "Root cause" analysis is something that
labor NGOs have been pushing corporations to think about for years. It

As an example, she explained that a t-shirt design may be changed at the last minute by
Nike design people, which causes a factoiy to employ more overtime to meet the deliveiy
deadline. An audit of that factoiy may find a breach of hours of work limits, but that
would not be the Sourcing agent's fault.
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appears that the discourse at least is beginning to seep into management
systems.
Interestingly, Nike does not evaluate the Compliance staff on factory
compliance.
Rather, the job of Compliance staff is to observe,
investigate, report back, and to help formulate remedial plans. Morris
explained that evaluating Compliance staff on factory comphance records
w^ould lead to a "poor set of incentives". LS, on the other hand, does
evaluate its assessors on the basis of factory compliance levels. This
system evolved primarily in the past few years. According to Kobori, the
intemal assessors, who are located in the Code of Conduct Department,
and the Sourcing employees are responsible for monitoring compliance
with the Guidelines, and for developing corrective plans whenever
violations are discovered. I f factories fail to improve over time, that
failure reflects poorly on the assessors, the Regional Manager, and
responsible Sourcing workers.
Perhaps the most interesting observations flowing from this study relate to
what has happened since these companies disclosed their factory lists.
Neither company reported any adverse effect that they could link to the
disclosure. There was not a sudden increase in reported incidents of laborrelated problems, and there have not been problems related to competitors
using the information in ways harmflil to the companies. It is too soon to
judge whether factory disclosure will tend to encourage longer term
supplier relationships. Kobori believes that factory disclosure introduces
an important element of accountability at the factory level "that will
encourage factories to maintain positive working conditions and begin to
Kobori explained the rationale as follows:
In my view, i f the factoiy fails to meet the initial action plan, it means that the
assessor either had not communicated the messages clearly enough, or has not
followed up with them sufficiently. Now, i f they fail to meet it, it's up to the
assessor to enlist the support of his or her business partner on the sourcing side
to send a strong message to the factoiy. I f the factoiy still doesn't get it, then it's
up to the assessor and the (Sourcing) business partner to escalate. So there's a
process in place, so it really is the assessor, and it's also the Regional Manager,
who need to work together to make sure that the factoiy performance is
improving.
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foster greater factory ownership of the comphance process". However,
more time will be needed to assess the effects, i f any, on the factory
owners and on the actual conditions of work in the factories.
Most interesting is the effect that the disclosure has had in terms of
collaboration and engagement both within the apparel industry and
between the companies and external actors. Both LS and Nike contacted
competitors after they had disclosed their factory list and encouraged them
to review the list and identify shared factories with the hope that fiirther
discussions could follow about possible joint actions.
For example,
Caitlin Morris explained this process as follows:
...we picked up the phone and literally started saying, "Hey Levis,
hey so and so, we've published our list, could you look at it, and
even if you don't want to be transparent pubhcly, would you share
with us which factories we share. It wasn't until we started doing
that on a systematic basis that I could build a map, and go, oh,
we've now identified 30 percent overlap in our supply chain with
the following 15 brands.
Kobori added that LS also contacted NGOs after they released their list:
After we made our list public, we reached out directly to a lot of
other brands, as well as NGOs... We said, here's our hst, i f
you're in any of these factories, if you're already monitoring these
factories, tell us.
So we can start to work together and
collaborating on the monitoring and on the remediation. And
maybe if, you know, you're doing some training in the factory and
we're doing some training in the factory, maybe we can get
together on that... We got a veiy strong response, everyone was
interested.
These discussions have led to meetings of brands, monitors, and factories.
LS has been convening these meetings, which have taken place in five
different countries, with the intention of discussing ways to share
information and collaborate in monitoring, training, and remediation.
Nike is participating in those meetings, as are a variety of other apparel
brands, and Kobori indicated that he envisions NGOs becoming part of
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these discussions in the fiiture. Discussions are cautious at the moment, as
the companies become comfortable with one another. There are also
concems about the possible limits of this sort of collaboration under U.S.
anti-tmst laws, an area that needs firrther exploration.^* I f anti-tmst laws
prevent companies from working together towards sensible solutions to
labor abuse problems, then those laws may need to be revised as surely
this was not the legislative intent.

V I . CONCLUSION
So, is factory disclosure regulation worthy of serious investigation? I
would conclude that it is. I f other companies were to respond to the "risk"
of having a transparent global supply chain by introducing measures
similar to those witnessed at Nike and LS—developing and maintaining
supplier factory databases, expanding factory monitoring capabilities,
estabhshing dedicated labor compliance personnel and clear chains of
command that encourage quick infonnation sharing about factory
conditions—then factory disclosure would contribute positively to the
challenge of how to discourage abusive labor practices, at home or abroad.
The fact that factoiy disclosure appears also to be encouraging
collaboration within industry and between industry and external labor
organizations in the hopes of identitying more efficient and effective long
term solutions also supports a move towards factory disclosure regulation.
Moreover, there is little evident downside risk from regulated factory
disclosure. No doubt, factory disclosure increases the potential that the
public may leam about abusive labor practices within a supply chain.
However, while it is easy to understand why apparel companies and
retailers would like to keep that sort of information from the public, there
is no policy justification for allowing them to do so. The fact that more
and more companies are now voluntarily disclosing their factory lists
proves that it is not economically or practically impossible to do this.
Trae, smaller companies than Nike, LS, and Timberland will not have the
same resources to invest in factoiy disclosure and factory monitoring. But
factory disclosure need not cost companies millions of dollars. It does
See S. Murray, Alliances Heed Anti-Trust Traps, Financial Times, Jan. 5, 2006

2 0 0 8 ] C A N FACTORY LIST DISCLOSURE IMPROVE LABOR PRACTICES?

57

require companies using sourcing agents to ensure those intermediaries
pass along the contractor list, but companies should be requiring this
anyways—otherwise they are ignoring what happens in their supplier
factories altogether.^^
The argument that factory address is somehow proprietary and competitive
is also unconvincing. As noted, for experts working in the apparel
sourcing industry, it is not difficult to leam which factories specific
companies are using i f that information is perceived as useful. Indeed,
factory owners are happy to brag about this information. The emergence
of initiatives such as the Fair Factories Clearinghouse is evidence that,
within the apparel industry, there is a willingness to share information
about supplier factories. It is the risk associated with sharing this
information publicly that concems many apparel companies and retailers.
As a labor policy, factory disclosure also has the benefit of neutrality in
terms of the content of substantive labor standards. Claims that a
Canadian or American law requiring factory disclosure is protectionist do
not withstand scmtiny. Factory disclosure imposes no substantive
standards. Rather, it is intended only to facilitate monitoring of labor
practices—^what employment standards employers are expected to adhere
too remains a question for national governments, international law, and
bargaining between factory owners and their employees and their unions,
and apparel companies, increasingly in the form of corporate codes of
conduct.
Factory disclosure regulation is an incremental approach to addressing
labor practices in the global apparel industry, to be sure. And details about
how a regulatory model would operate and be enforced in practice would
need to be worked out. Since many companies still do not pay attention to
which factories supply their product, it may make sense to give companies
a reasonable amount of time to prepare for the disclosure. But these are
details. As Kobori noted, a law requiring factory disclosure would at this
point "level the playing field", and more importantly, "for society as a
See for example. Roots Canada, Workplace Code of Conduct (June 2006),
littp://www.roots.com/new canada/html/about_us/RootsCodeofConduct.pdf
(requires
their contractor factories to "disclose the name and address of every subcontractor used in
the production of Roots garments and products").
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whole", it would "do what a law is designed to do, which is to better the
common good."

